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WE NEED PROFESSIONAL HELP: 
ADVOCATING FOR A CONSISTENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW WHEN 
REGULATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL 
SPEECH IMPLICATE THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
Abstract: The circuits are split as to what level of scrutiny should be applied 
to challenged regulations of professional speech. In the past two years, the 
Third and Fourth Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied intermediate scrutiny 
to regulations of professional speech, whereas the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals has applied rational basis review. The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals 
first applied rational basis review, but then changed its approach in 2015 and 
applied intermediate scrutiny. This Note argues for the adoption of intermedi-
ate scrutiny as the appropriate standard with which to analyze regulations of 
professional speech. Intermediate scrutiny is the only standard that effectively 
balances the government’s interests with the First Amendment speech rights 
of professionals. In doing so, this Note explores the genesis of the profession-
al speech doctrine as well as the implications of withholding First Amendment 
protections from professional speech. 
INTRODUCTION 
On August 19, 2013, Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey signed a 
bill that prohibited licensed therapists in the state of New Jersey from using 
sexual orientation change efforts, also known as conversion therapy, to treat 
minors.1 Conversion therapy seeks to eliminate or reduce same-sex attractions 
in homosexual people and often involves prayer and psychological counsel-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See N.J. STAT. §§ 45:1-54 to -55 (2015); Christie Signs Bill Banning Gay Conversion Ther-
apy in New Jersey, CBS NEWS (Aug. 19, 2013, 2:02 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/christie-
signs-bill-banning-gay-conversion-therapy-in-new-jersey/ [http://perma.cc/79L8-P9GM] [herein-
after Christie Signs Bill]. New Jersey was the second state to pass such a bill after California 
passed a similar one that became effective in January of 2013. Christie Signs Bill, supra; see CAL. 
BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2015); N.J. STAT. §§ 45:1-54 to -55; King v. Christie, 981 
F. Supp. 2d 296, 302 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d sub nom. King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216, 246 
(3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015); Geoffrey A. Fowler, California Bill Bans 
Gay-Conversion Therapy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 30, 2012, 10:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10000872396390444914904577622153696305504 (reporting on the California legislature 
passing the first law in the United States that banned conversion therapy with minors). 
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ing.2 In the signing note, Governor Christie reflected that “[g]overnment 
should tread carefully into this area and I do so here reluctantly.”3 
California and the District of Columbia have passed similar laws pro-
hibiting the use of conversion therapy with minors.4 Recently, however, the 
Oklahoma legislature considered a bill that would shield sexual orientation 
change therapy from state intervention.5 Although the American Psychiatric 
Association declassified homosexuality as a mental disorder more than for-
ty years ago, conversion therapy still has supporters in conservative and 
religious communities.6 
                                                                                                                           
 2 See Barry S. Anton, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association for the Legisla-
tive Year 2009, 65 AM. PSYCHOL. 385, 464 n.1 (2010) (defining “sexual orientation change ef-
forts” as referring to any attempt at changing sexual orientation, including behavioral or psycho-
analytic techniques and medical or religious approaches); Associated Press, Oklahoma: Bill In-
tended to Protect ‘Conversion Therapy’ Advances, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 24, 2015), http://nyti.ms/
1A4vUcZ [https://perma.cc/PR9M-XNA6] [hereinafter Bill Intended to Protect Conversion Ther-
apy] (describing conversion therapy as involving a range of practices, including prayer or psycho-
logical counseling, aimed at reducing or removing same-sex attraction). Advocates for children’s 
rights and gay rights consider conversion therapy a form of child abuse. See AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON APPROPRIATE THERAPEUTIC RESPONSES TO SEXUAL 
ORIENTATION 86 (2009), https://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/therapeutic-response.pdf [https://
perma.cc/AA4Z-LLGC] (noting concerns with providing sexual orientation change therapy to 
minors, in particular the serious ethical and human rights concerns about involuntary treatment); 
Christie Signs Bill, supra note 1 (reporting that the Assemblyman who sponsored the bill in the 
New Jersey Legislature described conversion therapy as “an insidious form of child abuse”). 
 3 N.J. Governor Chris Christie, Governor’s Statement upon Signing Assembly Bill No. 3371 
(Aug. 19, 2013), http://www.state.nj.us/governor/news/news/552013/pdf/20130819a_A3371.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/CP7U-U5VH]; see Christie Signs Bill, supra note 1 (quoting Governor Christie’s 
language from the signing note that accompanied his approval of the legislation). New Jersey has 
stood strongly behind the bill and has successfully defended it against appeal. See King, 981 
F. Supp. 2d at 302–03 (recounting initial challenge to bill by licensed therapists and holding that 
bill was constitutional). 
 4 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (prohibiting conversion therapy with minors); D.C. 
CODE § 7-1231.14a (2015) (same); Aaron C. Davis, D.C. Bans Gay Conversion Therapy of Mi-
nors, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-bans-gay-
conversion-therapy/2014/12/02/58e6aae4-7a67-11e4-84d4-7c896b90abdc_story.html [http://perma.
cc/7ZPN-LYHX]. 
 5 See H.B. 1598, 55th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2015) (making it expressly legal for a mental 
health provider to use sexual orientation change efforts on minors); Bill Intended to Protect Con-
version Therapy, supra note 2. Republican Representative Sally Kern, who authored the bill, con-
tends that it was about protecting the rights of parents and therapists. See Bill Intended to Protect 
Conversion Therapy, supra note 2 (reporting that an Oklahoma bill approved by the Children, 
Youth and Family Services Committee would protect the practice of conversion therapy and allow 
parents access to it for minors). The bill died without coming to a House vote. See Stephen Peters, 
Okla. Pro-Conversion “Therapy” Bill Dies on State House Floor, HUM. RIGHTS CAMPAIGN BLOG 
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/oklahoma-pro-conversion-therapy-bill-dies-on-
state-house-floor [http://perma.cc/AS9A-WBPM]. 
 6 See John J. Conger, Proceedings of the American Psychological Association, Incorporated, 
for the Year 1974: Minutes of the Annual Meeting of the Council of Representatives, 30 AM. PSY-
CHOL. 620, 620–51 (1975) (supporting the American Psychiatric Association’s removal of homo-
sexuality from its official list of mental disorders); see also Anton, supra note 2, at 464 n.1 (ex-
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The national debate over sexual orientation change therapy highlights a 
difficult legal question: should legislatures be able to curtail the speech of 
therapists, who are licensed professionals, on a single topic in order to protect 
minors from treatment that the medical community does not support?7 Some 
believe that legislatures should have the power to limit speech in this way.8 
Would the answer change, however, if the question was instead: should legis-
latures be able to curtail the speech of doctors, who are licensed profession-
als, on a single topic in order to protect minors from preventative medicine 
that the medical community supports?9 
The Florida legislature did not think so.10 On June 2, 2011, Florida Gov-
ernor Rick Scott signed into law a bill that restricted licensed health care 
practitioners’ ability to ask patients questions about firearm ownership.11 
Supporters of the law do not believe gun ownership is a public health issue 
                                                                                                                           
plaining the American Psychological Association’s position on homosexuality and noting that 
conversion therapy is supported by faith-based groups). 
 7 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 228 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (concluding that gov-
ernment’s prerogative to regulate occupations exists even when an occupation involves speech); 
Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 1043, 
1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a state’s police power allows it to regulate and license pro-
fessions within the state); Diahann DaSilva, Note, Playing a ‘Labeling Game’: Classifying Ex-
pression as Conduct as a Means of Circumventing First Amendment Analysis, 56 B.C. L. REV. 
767, 796 (2015) (arguing that speech of therapists should receive First Amendment protection and 
that a ban on conversion therapy would withstand such an inquiry); Christie Signs Bill, supra note 
1 (describing the passage of a law banning conversion therapy in New Jersey and the Governor’s 
reluctance to regulate on that topic). 
 8 See Jacob M. Victor, Ending ‘Gay Conversion’ for Good, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1g8SGKS [http://perma.cc/K62U-2D2E] (arguing that conversion therapy should be 
outlawed through laws that prevent deceptive practices). 
 9 Cf. Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger III), 797 F.3d 859, 869 (11th Cir. 
2015) (addressing question of whether a ban on physician speech about firearms was constitution-
al); Editorial, Doctor Gag Law Indefensible, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Sept. 15, 2011, 7:19 PM), 
http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/editorials/doctor-gag-law-indefensible/1191767 [http://perma.
cc/B3NF-4UJQ] (arguing that Florida should not be permitted to prevent doctors from discussing 
gun ownership with patients). 
 10 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 869–70 (recounting Florida’s passage of a law that re-
stricts what Florida health care professionals may say to their patients about firearms). 
 11 Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 814 F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2011),  
(granting plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction). The law created Florida statute section 
790.338, entitled “Medical privacy concerning firearms; prohibitions; penalties; exceptions.” See 
FLA. STAT. § 381.026 (2012); id. § 790.338 (2012); Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. The 
law also amended FLA. STAT. § 456.072, entitled “Grounds for discipline; penalties; enforce-
ment.” See FLA. STAT. § 456.072; Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 869 (explaining the codification 
of the Florida law). The law restricts licensed health care practitioners’ ability to record infor-
mation about patients’ firearm ownership, ask patients about firearm ownership, discriminate 
against a patient on the basis of firearm ownership, or harass a patient about firearm ownership. 
FLA. STAT. § 790.338; see Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1371. 
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and stand behind the law as a protection of patient privacy.12 The medical 
community, however, considers gun ownership to be an important public 
health issue that should be addressed as part of routine preventative care.13 
Regardless of how one would answer these questions, one thing is clear: 
these laws implicate the First Amendment rights of professionals because 
they constrain “professional speech,” or what professionals may say to clients 
in the course of their provision of individual services.14 Addressing this First 
Amendment issue can be difficult because topics that implicate professional 
speech rights, such as conversion therapy and gun ownership, are often 
fraught with partisan rhetoric and ideals that cloud the debate.15 Yet states 
must find a way to balance the right of professionals to advise their clients 
with the interest the state has in protecting its citizens and regulating profes-
sional industries.16 
                                                                                                                           
 12 Gayland O. Hethcoat II, In the Crosshairs: Legislative Restrictions on Patient-Physician 
Speech About Firearms, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 8–9 (2011) (explaining that supporters 
and opponents of the law disagree on whether gun ownership is a public health issue). 
 13 See Christine S. Moyer, Public Health Approach: Physicians Aim to Prevent Gun Violence, 
AM. MED. NEWS (Sept. 10, 2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120910/health/309109949/
2/ [http://perma.cc/NBR4-N2TV] (describing the medical community’s efforts to reduce injuries 
caused by firearms through preventative care). The American Medical Association (“AMA”) 
encourages health practitioners to ask parents about firearm ownership as part of helping parents 
to childproof their home. See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 901 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (recount-
ing AMA policy that encourages members to ask patients about firearms in the home as part of 
ensuring the home is a safe place for children). 
 14 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (describing continuum of professional 
speech, which implicates the First Amendment, and professional conduct, which does not); Woll-
schlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 883–85 (providing a framework for determining whether a challenged 
professional regulation implicates the First Amendment). 
 15 See Janet L. Dolgin, Physician Speech and State Control: Furthering Partisan Interests at 
the Expense of Good Health, 48 NEW ENG. L. REV. 293, 302 & n.59, 342 (2014) (explaining that 
laws limiting physician speech about firearms and abortion were part of and reflected America’s 
“culture wars”). For example, most of the case law and literature about professional speech ad-
dresses physician speech related to the reproductive rights of women, a notoriously partisan topic. 
See id. at 295–300; Daniel Halberstam, Commercial Speech, Professional Speech, and the Consti-
tutional Status of Social Institutions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 771, 835 (1999) (explaining that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s albeit sparse treatment of professional speech has largely centered on physician’s 
speech about abortion and contraception). See generally Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833 (1992) (abortion); Stuart v. Camnitz (Stuart II), 774 F.3d 238, 247 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(same), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015); Centro Tepeyac v. Montgomery County, 722 F.3d 
184, 189 (4th Cir. 2013) (women’s reproductive health clinic). Yet, the concept of professional 
speech and the First Amendment rights associated with such speech extend far beyond these nar-
row, divisive topics. See Robert Kry, The “Watchman for Truth”: Professional Licensing and the 
First Amendment, 23 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 885, 886–88, 891–97 (2000) (describing the wide range 
of professions regulated by states, the ways in which those professions are regulated, and when 
professional speech implicates the First Amendment). 
 16 Compare Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208, 1229 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that California 
could ban conversion therapy on the theory that it was conduct and was therefore outside the pur-
view of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2015), with King, 767 F.3d at 229, 
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Courts have provided little clarity as to the extent to which the First 
Amendment rights of professionals should be protected or balanced against 
the interests of the state.17 The U.S. Supreme Court has not provided much 
guidance on how to balance these competing interests.18 In the past two 
years, several circuits have tackled the issue of professional speech, with 
varying results.19 Some courts have held that professional advice does not 
even qualify as speech under the First Amendment, while others have found 
that professional advice receives the heightened First Amendment protec-
tion of intermediate scrutiny.20 
This Note argues that courts should apply intermediate scrutiny to pro-
fessional speech regulations.21 Part I discusses general First Amendment 
principles that are relevant to understanding the nuances of recent federal 
appellate decisions on professional speech and the contours and history of 
the professional speech doctrine.22 Part II analyzes those recent federal ap-
pellate decisions on professional speech that have created a circuit split on 
the issue of what level of scrutiny to apply to regulations of professional 
speech.23 Part III argues that all regulations of professional speech are con-
                                                                                                                           
233 (holding that a New Jersey law banning conversion therapy banned speech and needed to 
survive intermediate scrutiny review in order to be constitutional). 
 17 See King, 767 F.3d at 235 n.19 (explaining the varying approaches circuit courts have taken 
on the issue of professional speech); Michael Scott Leonard, ‘Conversion Therapists’ Seek to Stay 
N.J. Ban Pending Supreme Court Appeal (C.A.3), WESTLAW J.: WESTLAW HEALTH DAILY BRIEF-
ING, Oct. 1, 2014, 2014 WL 4851992 (reporting on circuit split regarding the appropriate standard 
of review for regulations of professional speech). 
 18 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884; Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring); Thomas v. Col-
lins, 323 U.S. 516, 545, 548 (1945) (Jackson, J., concurring); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 20–
21, Doe ex rel. Doe v. Governor of N.J., 783 F.3d 150 (3d. Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1941) [hereinafter 
Doe Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (laying out the conflict among the circuits on the level of con-
stitutional scrutiny to apply to professional speech); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 17, Hines v. 
Alldredge, 783 F.3d 197 (5th Cir. 2015) (No. 14-40493) [hereinafter Hines Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari] (attesting that the U.S. Supreme Court has never “squarely addressed” professional 
speech). 
 19 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896 (holding that regulation of professional speech 
should be subject to intermediate scrutiny); King, 767 F.3d at 234 (holding that professional 
speech was speech that should be subject to intermediate scrutiny); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of 
Fla. (Wollschlaeger II), 760 F.3d 1195, 1217 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that professional speech 
was conduct that could be fairly regulated by the state when the regulation had only an incidental 
effect on speech), vacated, 797 F.3d 859; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (holding that professional 
speech was conduct and upholding challenged law under rational basis review); Moore-King v. 
County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 569–70 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding that professional speech 
doctrine allowed court to uphold county’s reasonable licensing scheme because it had only an 
incidental effect on speech). 
 20 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896 (applying intermediate scrutiny to speech); King, 
767 F.3d at 234 (same); Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217 (applying rational basis review to 
conduct); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222, 1231 (same). 
 21 See infra notes 173–221 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 29–104 and accompanying text. 
 23 See infra notes 105–172 and accompanying text. 
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tent-based, and that courts should therefore apply intermediate scrutiny to 
regulations of professional speech.24 
I. GIVING PROFESSIONAL ADVICE: PROFESSIONAL SPEECH AND THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
This Part explains First Amendment jurisprudence that relates to un-
derstanding the concept of professional speech and then discusses the few 
U.S. Supreme Court cases that have touched upon the professional speech 
doctrine.25 Section A discusses the different levels of review a court may 
apply in First Amendment challenges to regulations of speech.26 Section B 
discusses Reed v. Town of Gilbert, a 2015 U.S. Supreme Court case involv-
ing the First Amendment.27 Section C covers what is meant by professional 
speech and the professional speech doctrine and provides a brief history of 
the doctrine’s evolution.28 
A. When and How the First Amendment Protects Speech 
The First Amendment states that Congress “shall make no law . . . 
abridging the freedom of speech.”29 The most fundamental inquiry in a First 
Amendment case is whether speech is present at all.30 Where a court finds 
that speech is not present for the purposes of the First Amendment, it may 
circumvent a First Amendment analysis.31 Non-expressive conduct generally 
                                                                                                                           
 24 See infra notes 173–223 and accompanying text. 
 25 See infra notes 29–104 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 29–63 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 64–73 and accompanying text 
 28 See infra notes 74–104 and accompanying text. 
 29 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 30 See R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the First Place?: Determining the 
Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 1217, 1218, 1223 (2010) (stating that search-
ing for a “set of words that are both a precise equivalent to the meaning of ‘speech’ in our sense, 
and also easy to apply judicially” is futile). The conduct-speech distinction is particularly influen-
tial when considering regulations of professional speech because it gives a framework for deter-
mining whether the activity should receive First Amendment protection. See Kry, supra note 15, 
at 896–97. But see Eugene Volokh, Speech as Conduct: Generally Applicable Laws, Illegal 
Courses of Conduct, “Situation-Altering Utterances,” and the Uncharted Zones, 90 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1277, 1346 (2005) (suggesting that the “conduct-speech” distinction is “more misleading 
than helpful” when determining what standard of review to use for government regulation of pro-
fessional speech that implicate the First Amendment). 
 31 See Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011) (explaining that the First 
Amendment does not prohibit restrictions directed at conduct that have an incidental effect on 
speech); Rumsfeld v. Forum for Acad. & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 66 (2006) (stating 
that only conduct that has an expressive element has received First Amendment protection); Kris-
tie LaSalle, The Other 99% of the Expressive Conduct Doctrine: The Occupy Wall Street Move-
ment and the Importance of Recognizing the Contribution of Conduct to Speech, 18 TEX. J. ON 
C.L. & C.R. 1, 13–14, 42–43, 46 (2012) (explaining that states may regulate conduct through the 
2015] Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Professional Speech Regulations 2025 
receives no protection under the First Amendment’s right to free speech.32 For 
example, conduct such as administering medicine to a patient or performing a 
surgery is understood to be outside the purview of the First Amendment and 
may be regulated by the government.33 The inquiry becomes more difficult 
when the conduct in question involves speech, such as therapy or a medical 
screening that involves talking.34 The boundaries between speech and conduct 
remain very unclear.35 
                                                                                                                           
use of their police power). “Speech” is understood in First Amendment jurisprudence to encom-
pass both literal speech and actions that convey a message, also known as expressive conduct. See 
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (affirming that the First Amendment protects both 
“actual speech” and “symbolic or expressive conduct”). See generally United States v. Eichman, 
496 U.S. 310 (1990) (protecting flag burning under the First Amendment); Spence v. Washington, 
418 U.S. 405 (1974) (protecting peace symbols affixed to flags under the First Amendment); 
Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (protecting wearing black arm 
bands as a form of protest under the First Amendment). 
 32 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (distinguishing laws that restrict “protected expression” 
from laws that restrict “nonexpressive conduct,” explaining that the latter restrictions may have an 
incidental effect on speech without implicating the First Amendment); Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 66 
(holding that conduct with no expressive content falls outside the purview of the First Amend-
ment); LaSalle, supra note 31, at 13–14 (mentioning that states may legitimately regulate nonex-
pressive conduct under their police power). 
 33 Kry, supra note 15, at 896. But see Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (holding that sexual orienta-
tion change therapy delivered only with speech was conduct for the purposes of constitutional 
analysis). 
 34 See Patrick Bannon, Note, Intermediate Scrutiny vs. the “Labeling Game” Approach: King 
v. Governor of New Jersey and the Benefits of Applying Heightened Scrutiny to Professional 
Speech, 23 J.L. & POL’Y 649, 678–80 (2015) (setting out the problems with labeling behavior as 
“speech” or “conduct” in terms of recent court cases involving professional speech); DaSilva, 
supra note 7, at 781–92 (describing the difficulty courts have had with classifying counseling as 
conduct or speech by addressing recent federal appellate court cases and their modes of analysis). 
Professional speech illustrates the shortcomings of the conduct-speech distinction because it falls 
squarely in the cross-section between speech and conduct. See Bannon, supra, at 658–59 (describ-
ing courts’ arbitrary use of “conduct” and “speech” labels to achieve their judicial ends). Compare 
Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217 (holding that a law banning physician speech about firearms 
regulated conduct), and King, 981 F. Supp. 2d at 317 (district court decision holding that a ban on 
conversion therapy was a ban on conduct, not speech), with Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 886 
(concluding that a law banning physician speech about firearms regulated speech and implicated 
the First Amendment), and King, 767 F.3d at 228–29 (holding that ban on conversion therapy 
regulated speech, not conduct, and must be analyzed under the First Amendment). 
 35 Compare Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 885–86 (parsing through each regulation at issue 
to determine whether it implicates speech or conduct and concluding that three of the four chal-
lenged provisions regulated speech and required First Amendment protection of some kind), and 
King, 767 F.3d at 229 (holding that “speech is speech” and concluding that a ban on conversion 
therapy implicated the First Amendment), with Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217 (holding that 
asking a patient questions constituted physician conduct that fell outside the purview of First 
Amendment protections), and Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229 (concluding that that sexual orientation 
change therapy delivered with speech was conduct that could be regulated without implicating the 
First Amendment). The U.S. Supreme Court has failed to introduce a “fully satisfactory” test for 
determining where the line between speech and non-communicative conduct lies. Charles W. 
“Rocky” Rhodes, The First Amendment Structure for Speakers and Speech, 44 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 395, 429 (2014). 
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If a court determines speech to be present, there are three categories of 
protection it can apply to regulation of that speech: rational basis review, in-
termediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny.36 Rational basis review requires that 
the regulation in question be “rationally related to a legitimate government 
interest.”37 This is the default standard of review for courts, and is very defer-
ential to a legislature’s choices for solving problems.38 States frequently re-
quest that courts apply rational basis review to a challenged law.39 Rational 
basis review presents little to no obstacle for challenged laws, as they are 
rarely struck down by the standard.40 Because rational basis review represents 
such a deferral to state interests, it is not applied to content-based re-
strictions.41 This is because of the inherent danger of allowing content-based 
restrictions to go unchecked by the judiciary.42 
Intermediate scrutiny requires a state to show that the challenged regu-
lation directly advances a substantial government interest and that the regu-
                                                                                                                           
 36 See David T. Hardy, The Right to Arms and Standards of Review: A Tale of Three Circuits, 
46 CONN. L. REV. 1435, 1437–38 (2014) (reviewing the levels of scrutiny applied by courts); see 
also Martha Swartz, Physician-Patient Communication and the First Amendment After Sorrell, 17 
MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 101, 105 (2012) (describing the different approaches a court can take 
when analyzing speech). 
 37 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (articulating ra-
tional basis review standard); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 
471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985) (applying rational basis review to First Amendment challenge to com-
pelled commercial speech where state’s interest was in curing consumer deception). 
 38 See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012) (explaining that rational basis 
review implies “near automatic approval” of the regulation at issue); Stephen M. Rich, Inferred 
Classifications, 99 VA. L. REV. 1525, 1534 n.35 (2013) (describing rational basis review as “the 
default mode of deferential review” when a court confronts a constitutional issue). 
 39 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (noting that North Carolina requested the court to apply ra-
tional basis review to the challenged statute); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 & n.7 (holding in favor of 
the government and applying rational basis review to challenged regulation); see also Ysursa v. 
Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 359–60 (2009) (applying rational basis review); City of 
Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442 (applying rational basis review in the context of an equal protection 
challenge, holding that the standard required only that the statute be “a rational means to a legiti-
mate end”). 
 40 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2552 (explaining that rational basis review implies “near-
automatic approval” of the regulation at issue); United States v. Sahhar, 917 F.2d 1197, 1201 n.5 
(1990) (referring to rational basis review as a “judicial rubber stamp”). 
 41 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (explaining that the First Amendment requires “heightened 
scrutiny” when speech is regulated based on the disagreement with the message conveyed); 
DaSilva, supra note 7, at 779 (stating that strict scrutiny applies to content-based restrictions on 
speech); see also City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (explaining that discriminatory statutes would 
be subject to heightened scrutiny). 
 42 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: 
Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2000) (explaining that 
content-based regulations run the risk of “targeting particular messages” and “attempting to con-
trol thoughts” by regulating speech on a certain topic); see also Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. 
Ct. 2218, 2229 (2015) (referencing the “danger of censorship” that content-based statutes pose). 
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lation is not more extensive than necessary to serve that interest.43 In First 
Amendment law, courts apply intermediate scrutiny to content-neutral regu-
lations, as well as time, place, and manner regulations.44 In addition, most 
commercial speech, which is speech that involves the exchange of goods or 
services for a profit, is analyzed using intermediate scrutiny.45 
Strict scrutiny is the highest amount of protection afforded under the 
First Amendment.46 When applying strict scrutiny, courts will uphold a reg-
ulation only if it “furthers a compelling interest” and is “narrowly tailored 
to achieve that interest.”47 Strict scrutiny is generally applied to regulations 
of public discourse or political speech because free speech is of central im-
portance to the success of the United States as a functioning democracy.48 
For example, published articles written by a professional that are dissemi-
nated publicly or speeches by professionals given publicly are generally 
insulated against regulation by the government.49 Any attempts by the gov-
                                                                                                                           
 43 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 213 (1997) (articulating intermediate scruti-
ny standard of review); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 566 (1980) (same).  
 44 Jay D. Wexler, Defending the Middle Way: Intermediate Scrutiny as Judicial Minimalism, 
66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 298, 317 (1998). Intermediate scrutiny takes several forms, one example 
of which is the test articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980, in Central Hudson Gas & 
Electric v. Public Service Commission of New York, which set forth a four-prong analysis. See 447 
U.S. at 566. If the speech “concerns lawful activity,” a court “ask[s] whether the asserted govern-
mental interest is substantial.” Id. If yes, a court next “determine[s] whether the regulation directly 
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is neces-
sary to serve that interest.” Id.  
 45 See King, 767 F.3d at 234 (explaining that commercial speech is reviewed using the inter-
mediate scrutiny test from Central Hudson); Robert A. Sedler, The “Law of the First Amendment” 
Revisited, 58 WAYNE L. REV. 1003, 1052–53 (2013); Swartz, supra note 36, at 105–06 (explain-
ing that commercial speech is generally analyzed under the Central Hudson test of intermediate 
scrutiny); S. Elizabeth Wilborn, Teaching the New Three Rs—Repression, Rights, and Respect: A 
Primer of Student Speech Activities, 37 B.C. L. REV. 119, 126 (1995) (noting that commercial 
speech receives less protection than political speech). 
 46 See Swartz, supra note 36, at 105–06. 
 47 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231 (enunciating the strict scrutiny standard); see also Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (explaining that to pass strict scrutiny, the 
regulation in question must be “justified by a compelling government interest” and “narrowly 
drawn to serve that interest”). 
 48 See McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1464 (2014) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (characterizing the protection of political speech as the “primary objective” of the 
First Amendment and “the lifeblood of a self-governing people”); Swartz, supra note 36, at 105 
(explaining that the First Amendment protects political speech because of how it relates to citi-
zens’ right to participate in a democracy); Lieutenant Colonel Jeremy S. Weber, Political Speech, 
the Military, and the Age of Viral Communication, 69 A.F. L. REV. 91, 96 (2013) (describing 
protection of political speech as “the heart of the First Amendment”). 
 49 See Kry, supra note 15, at 896–97. First Amendment protection is strongest when a profes-
sional is engaged in public dialogue. Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–28. 
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ernment to regulate this public discourse would be subject to strict scruti-
ny.50 
In select situations, a court will find that speech occurred, but not ex-
tend any First Amendment protection.51 Where the challenged regulation im-
pacts unlawful verbal acts, obscenity, child pornography, or government 
speech, there is no First Amendment protection provided because these are 
considered categories of unprotected speech.52 The U.S. Supreme Court has 
explicitly rejected attempts to add new categories of unprotected speech to 
those that have been delineated previously and are rooted in history.53 
The threshold determination courts make when considering which lev-
el of scrutiny to apply to a First Amendment challenge is whether a regula-
tion is content-based or content-neutral.54 In order to determine whether a 
challenged regulation is content-based or content-neutral, a court considers 
whether any speech has been proscribed because of the message the speech 
conveys.55 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 759 (1985) (reaffirm-
ing that speech on issues of public concern is “entitled to special protection”); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 
(White, J., concurring) (“Where the personal nexus between professional and client does not exist . . . 
it becomes regulation of speaking or publishing as such, subject to the First Amendment’s command 
that ‘Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.’”); N.Y. Times 
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (explaining that the First Amendment demonstrates a 
strong appreciation of and commitment to protecting public discourse). 
 51 See Sedler, supra note 45, at 1009–10; see also New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765–66 
(1982) (holding that the production and distribution of child pornography does not receive First 
Amendment protection); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (holding that obscenity does 
not receive First Amendment protection). 
 52 See Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2544 (listing categories of unprotected speech); Sedler, supra 
note 45, at 1009–10. In addition to these categories of unprotected speech, criminal acts such as 
bribery or perjury are not protected by the First Amendment. Sedler, supra note 45, at 1010. This 
concept of unprotected speech, however, only applies to activity that is “otherwise unlawful and 
does not involve the expression of an idea or the discussion of matters of public interest.” Id. at 
1012. The government cannot avoid First Amendment scrutiny by making the expression of an 
idea or discussion of a topic unlawful. See id. 
 53 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010) (explaining that courts do not have 
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment”). But see Ronald K.L. Collins, Exceptional Freedom—The Roberts Court, the First 
Amendment, and the New Absolutism, 76 ALB. L. REV. 409, 416–22 (2013) (listing forty-eight 
categories of unprotected expression). 
 54 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining 
that the “normal” First Amendment inquiry begins with a determination of whether a regulation is 
content-based or content-neutral); Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 49–50 (explaining that the dis-
tinction between content-based and content-neutral laws has evolved to become the determinative 
issue in nearly every free speech case); see also Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2232 (explaining that content-
based distinctions are subject to strict scrutiny and content-neutral distinctions are subject to a 
lower level of judicial scrutiny). 
 55 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (stating that a regulation is content-based if it “applies to par-
ticular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message conveyed” and that laws that 
are content-neutral on their face are content-based if they were passed because of government 
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A content-based statute differentiates permissible speech from imper-
missible speech on the basis of message and is presumptively invalid.56 An 
example of a content-based statute is a ban on advocacy of illegal conduct.57 
Content-based statutes that regulate speech are generally subject to strict 
scrutiny.58 This reflects the collective judgment that laws that restrict speech 
on the basis of content are more likely to be harmful than laws that do not 
differentiate based on message.59 In contrast, content-based statutes that 
regulate commercial speech are subject to heightened scrutiny.60 
                                                                                                                           
disagreement with the messaged conveyed); DaSilva, supra note 7, at 778–79 (describing how 
courts analyze content-based and content-neutral statutes). The decision of whether a regulation is 
content-based or content-neutral, however, can be difficult. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 
U.S. 622, 642 (1994) (observing that the initial determination of whether a regulation is content-
based or content-neutral can be difficult). For years, the Court has been criticized for its “unprin-
cipled, unpredictable and deeply incoherent” application of the content-neutrality principle. See 
Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 VA. L. REV. 231, 232–33 & n.3 (2012). 
 56 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2226 (describing content-based laws as “presumptively unconstitu-
tional”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (explaining that content-based regu-
lations are presumed to be invalid); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d 
at 1055 (explaining that the most important inquiry in determining whether a law is content-based 
is whether it was passed because of agreement or disagreement with the message conveyed). But 
see B. Jessie Hill, Casey Meets the Crisis Pregnancy Centers, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 59, 60 
(2015) (explaining that there are specific contexts in which “traditional First Amendment interests 
in open, free, and robust communication are more limited” and the government is given more 
freedom to regulate). 
 57 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (holding that law prohibiting advo-
cacy of criminal conduct violated the First Amendment); Eugene Volokh, Content Discrimination 
and the First Amendment (Including the “Secondary Effects” Doctrine), VOLOKH CONSPIRACY 
(June 21, 2010, 12:36 PM), http://volokh.com/2010/06/21/content-discrimination-and-the-first-
amendment-including-the-secondary-effects-doctrine/ [http://perma.cc/9HPQ-UUSX] (reviewing 
classic examples of content-based laws). 
 58 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (holding that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny); 
Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543–44 (explaining that content-based restrictions on speech are presumed 
invalid). But see Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring) (explaining that content-
discrimination “cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny”); id. at 2237–38 (Kagan, J., 
concurring) (drawing on rationales for First Amendment protection to conclude that not all con-
tent-based laws, particularly those that are not viewpoint-based, should always be subject to strict 
scrutiny). 
 59 Cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 42, at 50 (“Content-based restrictions risk the government 
targeting particular messages and attempting to control thoughts on a topic by regulating 
speech.”). 
 60 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664 (explaining that the First Amendment requires “heightened 
scrutiny” whenever a regulation targets speech because of disagreement with the message con-
veyed). In Sorrell, the Court distinguished content-based commercial speech as requiring a higher 
level of scrutiny than other commercial speech. Id. at 2667–68. The Court did not say whether the 
“heightened scrutiny” it used in Sorrell was intermediate scrutiny, strict scrutiny, or something in 
between. See id.; Agatha M. Cole, Note, Internet Advertising After Sorrell v. IMS Health: A Dis-
cussion on Data Privacy & the First Amendment, 30 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 283, 307–08 
(2012) (stating that it is “unclear” how the “heightened scrutiny” standard used in Sorrell com-
pares to rational basis review, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny); see also Sorrell, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2679 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing the majority as applying a “unforgiving brand of 
intermediate scrutiny”). Varying interpretations of the Sorrell standard of scrutiny have been evi-
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A content-neutral statute differentiates neither on the basis of view-
point nor on the basis of speaker.61 Example of content-neutral statutes are 
bans on all loudspeakers or on sleeping in public parks.62 Content-neutral 
statutes that regulate commercial speech are subject to rational basis review 
when the government has an interest in preventing consumer deception.63 
B. Evolving Doctrine: Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s Impact on First 
Amendment Rights 
In 2015, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a 
law which “singles out specific subject matter for differential treatment” is 
content-based, and thus automatically subject to strict scrutiny analysis.64 In 
Reed, the Court considered a challenge to a town’s sign ordinance that im-
posed more restrictions on a certain category of signs.65 The Court held the 
                                                                                                                           
dent in judicial decisions. Compare Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 912 (citing Sorrell as applying 
intermediate scrutiny), with Wollschlaeger I, 814 F. Supp. 2d at 1377 (citing Sorrell for the propo-
sition that strict scrutiny applied to the challenged regulation of professional speech). 
 61 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (explaining that regulation court held to be 
content-neutral did not restrict speech based on viewpoint or subject-matter and applied equally to 
the members of the general public). 
 62 See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 289, 295 (1984) (holding that 
regulation prohibiting camping in specific parks was not in violation of the First Amendment); 
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87–89 (1949) (holding that ban on loudspeakers was constitution-
al); Volokh, supra note 57 (providing examples of content-neutral statutes). 
 63 See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651 (explaining that although disclosure requirements may si-
lence some protected commercial speech, a company’s First Amendment rights are “adequately 
protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to the State’s interest in pre-
venting deception”); Jennifer M. Keighley, Can You Handle the Truth? Compelled Commercial 
Speech and the First Amendment, 15 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 539, 556–59 (2012) (discussing scope of 
Zauderer decision). 
 64 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230, 2232–33; see also Norton v. City of Springfield, 612 F. 
App’x 386, 387 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that the Reed majority opinion “effectively abolishes 
any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation”); Appellees’ Submission 
Requested by the Court at 1, Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859 (No. 12-14009) [hereinafter Appel-
lees’ Submission] (observing that the U.S. Supreme Court held in Reed that content-based laws 
are subject to strict scrutiny, “without qualification”). The Reed holding has begun to ripple 
through the circuit courts. See Norton, 612 F. App’x at 386–87 (recounting request for supple-
mental briefs on Reed, granting petition for rehearing, and applying Reed to the challenged ordi-
nance); Appellees’ Submission, supra, at 1 (recounting court’s request for supplementary briefing 
on whether the Reed holding requires application of strict scrutiny to regulation of professional 
speech). 
 65 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224 (citing PLANNING DEP’T, TOWN OF GILBERT, LAND DEVEL-
OPMENT CODE, ch. 1, § 4.402 (2005), available at http://www.gilbertaz.gov/home/showdocu
ment?id=9660 [http://perma.cc/NJ65-5QTW]) (categorizing signs by information conveyed and 
applying different restrictions to each category)). The category that was more restricted was enti-
tled “Temporary Directional Signs Relating to a Qualifying Event.” See id. The petitioners in Reed 
were members of a church that used signs to inform the public of the time and location of services, 
which changed each week. See id. at 2225. 
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ordinance to be a content-based regulation of speech and subjected the or-
dinance to strict scrutiny.66 
Displaying the nuance of the issues raised by Reed, six of the Justices 
wrote or joined concurring opinions.67 Justice Stephen Breyer rejected a one-
size-fits-all approach to First Amendment jurisprudence and argued that a 
category like “content discrimination” cannot always require a strict scrutiny 
analysis.68 Justice Breyer cautioned that the Court had “gone too far” in hold-
ing that content discrimination “triggers” a strict scrutiny analysis.69 He rea-
soned that most government activities involve speech and are regulated.70 
These regulations of speech necessarily require content discrimination, but do 
not require the full protections afforded by the strict scrutiny analysis.71 To 
hold otherwise is “a recipe for judicial management of ordinary government 
regulatory activity.”72 Justice Breyer offered a solution: use a content discrim-
ination analysis as a supplement to a basic First Amendment analysis, which 
looks to the proportionality between regulatory objectives and harm to First 
Amendment interests.73 
                                                                                                                           
 66 See id. at 2224. The Court held that a regulation is content-based if it “applies to particular 
speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message conveyed.” Id. at 2227. The Court 
also held that laws that are content-neutral on their face, but were adopted because of government 
disagreement with the message conveyed are considered content-based. See id. The Court held 
that both sets of content-based laws must withstand strict scrutiny to survive. See id. 
 67 See id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2236 (Ka-
gan, J., concurring); see also Doe Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 12 (observing 
that the majority rule announced in Reed has “no exceptions” and that other justices “who were 
not prepared to go as far” wrote concurring opinions). Justice Samuel Alito was joined in his con-
curring opinion by Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice Sonia Sotomayor. Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 
2233 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito offered examples of rules pertaining to signs that would 
not be considered content-based to disabuse plaintiffs and municipalities of the notion that the 
Reed opinion leaves them unable to regulate signage. See id. at 2233–34. Justice Stephen Breyer 
wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Elena Kagan wrote a con-
curring opinion in which Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Justice Breyer joined. Id. at 2236 (Ka-
gan, J., concurring). 
 68 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer also joined Justice 
Kagan’s concurring opinion in which she came to the same conclusion. See id. at 2234, 2238 (Ka-
gan, J., concurring) (explaining that strict scrutiny is not required for subject-matter regulation that 
does not raise the possibility of viewpoint discrimination). 
 69 Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring); see also Adam Liptak, Court’s Free-Speech Expansion 
Has Far-Reaching Consequences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/18
/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far-reaching-consequences.html [https://perma.cc/KL
8D-KNW6] (reporting that some view the Reed decision, if read literally, as “destabliz[ing] First 
Amendment law” and possibly requiring courts to “water down the potency of strict scrutiny”). 
 70 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
 71 See id. at 2234–35 (offering as examples securities regulations, regulations on prescription 
drug labeling, regulations requiring doctor-patient confidentiality, and signage requirements at 
petting zoos). 
 72 Id. at 2234. 
 73 See id. 
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C. Professional Speech and the “Professional Speech Doctrine” 
The concept of who professionals are is fairly expansive.74 A profession-
al is defined in layman’s terms as someone whose job requires “special edu-
cation, training, or skill.”75 State legislatures or the federal government insti-
tute the requirements for professions, typically through licensing schemes.76 
States are allowed to license the professions under their police power.77 Such 
professional licensing laws determine who may enter a profession, who may 
remain practicing within that profession, and what constitutes appropriate 
practice of that profession.78 Common examples of professionals who are 
required to have a license to practice in certain states include doctors, attor-
neys, and accountants.79 It is less common knowledge that state and federal 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Kry, supra note 15, at 886–88 (describing professionals as those licensed by the state to 
practice a particular occupation). The U.S. Supreme Court and circuit courts have ruled in many 
instances on cases implicating the free speech rights of professionals. See, e.g., Fla. Bar v. Went 
for It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995) (lawyers); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 763 (1993) (ac-
countants); Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 784 (1988) (fundraising 
professionals); Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183 (financial advisors); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 242 (doctors); 
King, 767 F.3d at 220 (licensed counselors); Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 563, 565 (fortune-tellers); 
Locke v. Shore, 634 F.3d 1185, 1189 (11th Cir. 2011) (interior designers). 
 75 Professional, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/professional 
[http://perma.cc/FH6D-MZ49] (defining professional as “relating to a job that requires special 
education, training, or skill”). 
 76 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112 (2015) (laying out regulatory scheme for occupations 
affecting public health); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-100 (2014) (stating that the Virginia may impose 
regulations on professions to protect the public interest when a profession involves specialized 
skills and the public would benefit from assurances of professional ability); WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 18 (2014) (articulating regulations for professions such as accountants, embalmers, midwifery, 
and others). Historically, occupational licensing has largely been left to the states. See Dent v. 
West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 122 (1889) (observing that “from time immemorial” states have 
imposed occupational licensing requirements in order to protect the public); Morris M. Kleiner & 
Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of Occupational Licensing on the Labor 
Market, 31 J. LAB. ECON. 173, 175 (2009) (describing results of survey aimed at understanding 
occupational licensing schemes in the United States). 
 77 Watson v. Maryland, 218 U.S. 173, 176 (1910) (“It is too well settled to require discussion 
at this day that the police power of the states extends to the regulation of certain trades and call-
ings . . . .”); Betancur v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 296 F. App’x 761, 763 (11th Cir. 2008) (stating that 
states may regulate professions under their police power); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of 
Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1054 (holding in part that a state’s police power allows it to regulate 
and license professions within the state “especially when public health concerns are affected”). 
 78 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 247 (describing the types of laws states may enact to regulate the 
professions); see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.04.450 (2014) (describing instances which would 
necessitate revocation of a license to practice accounting in Alaska); N.Y. CT. R. § 1500.23 
(McKinney 2015) (making continuing legal education mandatory for barred attorneys in New 
York); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-34-15 (2009) (declaring that a practical nurse may be licensed to prac-
tice in the state of Rhode Island in one of two ways: either by examination or by endorsement). 
 79 See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 112 § 2 (describing registration of physicians in order to be 
licensed by the state to practice medicine); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.04.015 (describing the purpose 
of regulating accountants); Fla. Bar, 515 U.S. at 620 (denying First Amendment challenge to state 
bar association regulation of lawyers’ speech); Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 869 (rejecting phy-
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governments together license about five hundred different occupations, in-
cluding barbers, real estate brokers, electricians, and even interior designers.80 
Because clients rely on professionals to perform tasks for them that re-
quire specialized knowledge or skills, licensing ensures that professionals 
actually possess such specialized knowledge or skills.81 Clients must be able 
to trust that the professional they hire is qualified to give advice or perform 
tasks necessary to that profession.82 In fact, the primary reason that states 
have an interest in regulating professions is to protect their citizens from 
misinformation or malpractice—in the case of advice-driven professions 
such as law or medicine—as well as protecting citizens’ health, safety, and 
welfare, in the case of potentially hazardous professions such as electricians 
or engineers.83 
When used by lower courts and scholars, the term “professional 
speech” generally refers to “personalized” speech by a professional that oc-
curs “in the context of a fiduciary-type relationship” between a professional 
and that professional’s client.84 The most important aspect of professional 
                                                                                                                           
sicians’ First Amendment challenge to state regulation prohibiting speech with patients about 
firearm ownership); Accountant’s Soc’y of Va. v. Bowman, 860 F.2d 602, 603 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(affirming lower court’s ruling that state’s regulation of professional speech of accountants who 
were not Certified Public Accountants was constitutional). 
 80 Kry, supra note 15, at 886; see 49 U.S.C. §§ 401–465 (2012) (covering regulation of pi-
lots); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 5800–5812 (West 2011) (covering business and professional 
codes for licensed interior designers in California); Locke, 634 F.3d at 1189–91 (holding that li-
censing statute covering interior designers in Florida did not implicate free speech rights). It is 
estimated that licensing laws affect around one-third of the American workforce. Kry, supra note 
15, at 886. 
 81 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (explaining what it means to “engage[] in 
the practice of a profession”); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY ET AL., OCCUPATIONAL LICENSING: A 
FRAMEWORK FOR POLICYMAKERS 11 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/
licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YWV-WNCD] (describing the benefits 
of occupational licensing); Kry, supra note 15, at 887 (explaining general characteristics of what 
an occupational licensing scheme requires). 
 82 See Kry, supra note 15, at 887–88 (explaining that the most common justification for pro-
fessional licensure is to protect the public because professional-client relationships often have an 
informational asymmetry that may make it hard for the client to make informed decisions). 
 83 See id.; see, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-1-10 (2011) (explaining that protecting the public 
interest is the sole purpose of enacting regulations on professions); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-100 
(2014) (describing rationale for imposing regulations on professionals in that state); WASH. REV. 
CODE § 18.04.015 (2015) (explaining that purpose of regulation of accounts is to protect the pub-
lic interest). 
 84 David T. Moldenhauer, Circular 230 Opinion Standards, Legal Ethics and First Amend-
ment Limitations on the Regulation of Professional Speech by Lawyers, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 
843, 891–92 (2006); see Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 887 (defining professional speech as 
“speech uttered by a professional in furtherance of his or her profession and within the confines of 
a professional-client relationship”); King, 767 F.3d at 232 (defining professional speech as speech 
“used to provide personalized services to a client based on the professional’s expert knowledge 
and judgment”); Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569 (defining professional speech as speech through 
which a professional “purports to exercise judgment on behalf of the client in the light of the cli-
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speech is the context within which it occurs: a relationship between a trust-
ed professional and a client.85 This understanding of professional speech 
grew out of Justice Byron White’s concurring opinion to the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s 1985 decision in Lowe v. SEC, in which he used the term “personal 
nexus” to describe the hallmark of professional speech.86 
The professional speech doctrine operates at the juncture of state power 
to regulate professionals and the free speech rights of those professionals.87 It 
has been used to support the constitutionality of state regulation of profes-
sions that impacts speech.88 The professional speech doctrine is one of the 
least developed areas in First Amendment jurisprudence.89 The few times the 
                                                                                                                           
ent’s individual needs and circumstances” (quoting Accountant’s Soc’y of Va., 860 F.2d at 604)); 
Kry, supra note 15, at 907–11 (defining professional speech as “truly personalized” advice that is 
“characteristic dependent” and “person-to-person”). 
 85 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (White, J., concurring) (conceiving of the “personal nexus” 
between professional and client as the touchstone of when professional speech receives First 
Amendment protections); Halberstam, supra note 15, at 834 (describing how the presence of a 
professional relationship “triggers a contextual First Amendment review” that is focused on the 
social relationship). 
 86 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring); Accountant’s Soc’y of Va., 860 F.2d at 
604 (stating that Justice White’s concurrence in Lowe “provides sound, specific guidelines” for 
determining the point at which a regulation stops being a regulation of a profession and becomes a 
regulation of speech). 
 87 Nicole Brown Jones, Note, Did Fortune Tellers See This Coming? Spiritual Counseling, 
Professional Speech, and the First Amendment, 83 MISS. L.J. 639, 649 (2014) (stating that the 
professional speech doctrine is used “when there is a ‘collision between the power of government 
to license and regulate those who would pursue a profession . . . and the rights of freedom of 
speech’” (quoting Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (White, J., concurring))). 
 88 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 228 (White, J., concurring) (“The power of government to regulate 
the professions is not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech.”); Moore-King, 
708 F.3d at 569 (explaining that under the professional speech doctrine the government may li-
cense and regulate professionals without implicating the First Amendment); Kry, supra note 15, at 
891 (describing that a court’s determination that a professional regulation controls conduct and not 
speech leads to the conclusion that the regulation is valid). 
 89 Jones, supra note 87, at 649. The phrase “professional speech doctrine” has been used in 
only eight published cases to date. See King, 767 F.3d at 231–32 (discussing professional speech 
doctrine when holding that licensed counselors do not receive full protection of First Amendment 
when providing services to clients); Centro Tepeyac, 722 F.3d at 189 (reiterating holding from 
Moore-King that professional speech doctrine allows the government to license and regulate pro-
fessionals without implicating the First Amendment); Cooksey v. Futrell, 721 F.3d 226, 239 (4th 
Cir. 2013) (holding that professional speech doctrine was irrelevant to determining Article III 
standing of appellant); Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 569 (applying professional speech doctrine analy-
sis to spiritual counselor’s First Amendment challenge of a state regulation); Tepeyac v. Mont-
gomery County, 5 F. Supp. 3d 745, 748, 760–61 (D. Md. 2014) (citing Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 
(White, J., concurring)) (analyzing when professional speech doctrine applies in dispute about 
county ordinance that compelled Limited Service Pregnancy Resource Center to post sign saying 
that there was not a licensed medical professional on staff); Stuart v. Loomis (Stuart I), 992 
F. Supp. 2d 585, 587–88, 596 & n.20 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (discussing contours of professional 
speech doctrine in case about compelled physician speech related to abortion), aff’d, 774 F.3d 
238; Kagan v. City of New Orleans, 957 F. Supp. 2d 774, 780 n.18 (E.D. La. 2013) (“Because the 
2015] Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Professional Speech Regulations 2035 
U.S. Supreme Court has confronted regulations of professional speech, it has 
struggled with balancing the state’s need to regulate against the freedoms 
guaranteed by the Constitution.90 With such minimal guidance, lower courts 
have failed to establish a workable analytical framework for reviewing re-
strictions on professional speech.91 
The genesis of the professional speech doctrine was Justice Robert H. 
Jackson’s concurring opinion to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1944 decision in 
Thomas v. Collins.92 In Thomas, the Court addressed a state’s enforcement 
of a professional registration requirement to a union leader who spoke pub-
licly to a group of workers.93 Justice Jackson described the state as standing 
firm on its right to regulate the professions and the union leader as asserting 
his right to peaceably address a public gathering.94 At times, these two 
rights may overlap, yet Justice Jackson still saw a distinction between the 
two.95 Justice Jackson concluded that a state owes a duty to its citizens to 
protect them from untrustworthy or incompetent people, which is usually 
done by regulating professions with a licensing scheme, but that there is no 
such duty to protect citizens from particular messages, which would be ac-
complished by disallowing public speech on particular topics.96 
The next major development in the professional speech doctrine came 
in 1985, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Lowe v. SEC considered whether 
proscribing the speech of a formerly licensed professional implicated the 
                                                                                                                           
Court concludes that the City’s licensing scheme is content neutral, the Court need not decide 
whether the professional speech doctrine, if one exists in the Fifth Circuit, applies.”). 
 90 Stuart v. Huff, 834 F. Supp. 2d 424, 431 (M.D.N.C. 2011) (stating that the meaning of 
“professional speech” is unclear and observing that the U.S. Supreme Court has only used the 
phrase “in passing”). The U.S. Supreme Court has only used the term “professional speech” in two 
opinions, both of which were dissents. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 446 (2006) (Breyer, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he speech at issue is professional speech—the speech of a lawyer.”); Eden-
field, 507 U.S. at 779 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“But even if I agreed that the States may target 
only professional speech that directly harms the listener, I still would dissent in this case.”). 
 91 See Halberstam, supra note 15, at 834–35 (noting the lack of consistent methodology 
across courts for assessing professional speech regulations); Moldenhauer, supra note 84, at 843 
(observing that courts have been unable to provide a framework for assessing regulations of pro-
fessional speech). 
 92 See Thomas, 323 U.S. at 545, 548 (Jackson, J., concurring) (stating that speech at issue was 
public speech, not the practice of a vocation, and thus fully protected by the First Amendment); 
Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 568 (observing that the professional speech doctrine has been recognized 
by the U.S. Supreme Court “at least since” Thomas); Jones, supra note 87, at 649 (stating that the 
professional speech doctrine was first recognized in Thomas); Kry, supra note 15, at 897–98 (de-
scribing Thomas as the beginning of a line of cases concerning the professional speech doctrine). 
 93 Thomas, 323 U.S. at 520–21. 
 94 Id. at 544 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 95 Id. (“[T]he state may prohibit the pursuit of medicine as an occupation without its license, 
but I do not think it could make it a crime publicly or privately to speak urging persons to follow 
or reject any school of medical thought.”). 
 96 Id. at 545. 
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First Amendment.97 In his concurring opinion, Justice White declared that 
the government does not relinquish its power to regulate the professions 
simply because the practice of a profession might include speech.98 He not-
ed that there is a certain point at which a law stops being a regulation of a 
profession and becomes a regulation of speech and asserted that it is the 
role of the courts to determine where along the continuum of speech that 
point lies.99 The continuum ranges from professional speech—speech that 
occurs between a professional and client within the “personal nexus”—to 
public speech—speech that occurs outside of the personal nexus and profes-
sional advice-giving role and is protected by the First Amendment.100 For 
Justice White, the distinguishing factor between the two kinds of speech 
was the “personal nexus” between professional and client, within which 
speech by a professional can be construed as “incidental to the conduct of 
the profession.”101 
Finally, in 1992, in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 
v. Casey, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed professional speech in the con-
text of a dispute about Pennsylvania’s abortion statute’s informed consent 
requirement as well as four other parts of the statute.102 The plurality ad-
dressed the First Amendment challenge in just three sentences.103 The plu-
rality conceded that the regulation implicated physician’s First Amendment 
right not to speak, but said that it did so “only as part of the practice of med-
icine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”104 
                                                                                                                           
 97 Lowe, 472 U.S. at 183–85, 188–89. The Court heard a challenge to an injunction against 
the publication and distribution of newsletters containing investment advice by an investment 
adviser whose registration had been revoked by the SEC. See id.  
 98 Id. at 228 (White, J., concurring) (“The power of government to regulate the professions is 
not lost whenever the practice of a profession entails speech.”). 
 99 Id. at 230–32 (stating that “at some point, a measure is no longer a regulation of a profes-
sion, but a regulation of speech,” beyond which point the statute would be subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny, and that it is the job of the Court to establish a principle by which to deter-
mine whether a challenged law regulates speech or conduct). 
 100 See id. at 232. 
 101 See id. 
 102 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 881, 884 (plurality opinion) (rejecting First Amendment challenge 
to Pennsylvania’s informed consent abortion law); see also King, 767 F.3d at 230 (noting the 
briefness with which the Casey plurality dealt with the plaintiff’s First Amendment claim). 
 103 See Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion). 
 104 Id. Courts have interpreted this part of the Casey opinion to support both sides of the dis-
cussion as to whether or not professional speech should receive First Amendment protection. 
Compare Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 247, 249 (drawing support for holding that individuals do not 
abandon their First Amendment rights when practicing a profession from Casey), with Woll-
schlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1219 (“[T]here is no ‘constitutional infirmity’ where the speech rights of 
physicians are ‘implicated, but only as part of the practice of medicine, subject to reasonable li-
censing and regulation by the State.’” (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion))). 
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II. A DIFFERENCE OF PROFESSIONAL OPINIONS: CIRCUITS SPLIT ON WHAT 
LEVEL OF SCRUTINY SHOULD APPLY TO PROFESSIONAL SPEECH 
Currently, the Third, Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Ap-
peals are split as to what level of scrutiny should apply to professional 
speech.105 Without a clear framework for analyzing regulations of profession-
al speech, professionals are at the mercy of the local courts and their individ-
ual analyses and interpretations.106 Because the U.S. Supreme Court has nev-
er directly addressed the level of scrutiny to apply to regulations of profes-
sional speech, this issue is ripe for review.107 
This Part discusses the cases that created the circuit split over what 
level of scrutiny applies to professional speech.108 Section A covers two re-
cent decisions from the Ninth Circuit and the Eleventh Circuit that applied 
rational basis review to challenged regulations of professional speech.109 
Section B discusses three recent decisions from the Eleventh, Third, and 
Fourth Circuits that applied intermediate scrutiny to challenged regulations 
of professional speech.110 Section C discusses the arguments for strict scru-
tiny and the possible influence of the 2015 U.S. Supreme Court case, Reed 
v. Town of Gilbert, on regulations of professional speech.111 
                                                                                                                           
 105 See Leonard, supra note 17. See generally Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlae-
ger III), 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015) (applying intermediate scrutiny); Stuart v. Camnitz (Stuart 
II), 774 F.3d 238 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2838 (2015) (applying intermediate 
scrutiny); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d 216 (3d. Cir. 2014) (applying intermediate scrutiny), 
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015); Pickup v. Brown, 740 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. de-
nied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 (2015) (applying rational basis review); Moore-King v. County of Chester-
field, 708 F.3d 560 (4th Cir. 2013) (applying an unclear level of scrutiny).  
 106 See Hines Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 29–31 (describing the lack of 
clarity on First Amendment protection of professional speech as “an issue of national im-
portance”); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, King, 767 F.3d 216 (No. 14-672) [hereinafter 
King Petition for Writ of Certiorari] (“This conflict touches upon a critical question implicating 
the very livelihood of licensed professionals and determining what protection doctors and counse-
lors, as well as lawyers, accountants, and other professionals, receive for the speech occurring as 
part of the practice of their profession.”); Paul Sherman, Occupational Speech and the First 
Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 183, 183 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/occu
pational-speech-and-the-first-amendment/ [http://perma.cc/6PJ5-US7K] (observing that the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s failure to directly address the topic of professional speech has had “profound 
consequences”). 
 107 See Hines Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at i (presenting question about 
what the appropriate level of judicial review for regulations of professional speech is and noting 
that the Court has “never squarely addressed [the] constitutional status” of professional speech). 
 108 See infra notes 112–172 and accompanying text. 
 109 See infra notes 112–135 and accompanying text. 
 110 See infra notes 136–165 and accompanying text. 
 111 See infra notes 166–172 and accompanying text. 
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A. Conduct, Not Speech: Providing Minimal Protection to  
Professional Speech 
Although to some courts “[i]t is clear that individuals do not surrender 
their First Amendment rights entirely when they speak as professionals,” oth-
er courts have chosen to offer essentially no protection to speech that occurs 
in the context of a professional relationship.112 This section discusses two re-
cent federal appellate cases that applied rational basis review to regulations of 
professional speech.113 
The Ninth Circuit, in its 2013 decision in Pickup v. Brown, and the Elev-
enth Circuit, in its 2014 decision in Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida 
(“Wollschlaeger II”), used the professional speech doctrine to apply rational 
basis review to regulations of professional speech.114 The courts were able to 
apply rational basis review because they identified the behavior at issue as 
conduct, not speech.115 According to the dissent in Wollschlaeger II, however, 
rational basis review erodes the First Amendment rights of professionals be-
cause it simply does not provide enough protection for speech that conveys a 
message that is being silenced or compelled by the government.116 
In Pickup, the Ninth Circuit explicitly applied rational basis review to 
a regulation of professional speech.117 Pickup concerned a First Amendment 
challenge to a statute that prohibited healthcare providers from engaging in 
                                                                                                                           
 112 Compare Stuart v. Loomis (Stuart I), 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (M.D.N.C. 2014) (“[J]ust 
what ‘professional speech’ means and whether it receives a different degree of protection under 
the First Amendment is not particularly clear. Nonetheless, it is clear that individuals do not sur-
render their First Amendment rights entirely when they speak as professionals.”), aff’d, 774 F.3d 
238, with Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger II), 760 F.3d 1195, 1219–20 (11th 
Cir. 2014) (holding that the challenged law prohibiting physicians from asking patients about 
firearm ownership was a regulation of professional conduct that did not run afoul of the First 
Amendment), vacated, 797 F.3d 859, and Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222 (holding that the challenged 
law prohibiting conversion therapy was a regulation of professional conduct that did not violate 
the First Amendment rights of licensed therapist). 
 113 See infra notes 114–135 and accompanying text. 
 114 See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217 (holding that the challenged act was a valid regula-
tion of professional conduct, and not speech, and thus merited no First Amendment protection); 
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–31 (concluding that the challenged act regulated conduct, and not 
speech, and did not implicate the First Amendment). 
 115 See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217 (holding that the challenged law was appropriate); 
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (holding that rational basis review applied to the challenged law because 
the law regulated only treatment, which the court found to be conduct, not speech). 
 116 See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1231, 1239–42 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (explaining that 
the majority should have weighed the interests of the state against the rights of the physicians 
instead of refusing to apply First Amendment protection to the speech). 
 117 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (holding that the challenged law was “subject only to rational 
basis review and must be upheld if it bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest”). 
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court to explicitly apply rational basis review in a First 
Amendment analysis of a regulation of professional speech. See King, 767 F.3d at 235 n.19 (not-
ing that Pickup was the only Ninth Circuit court to explicitly apply a rational basis test). 
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sexual orientation change therapy with minors.118 The Ninth Circuit upheld 
the statute as a valid regulation of professional conduct.119 The majority ap-
plied rational basis review to the regulation and chose to uphold it because 
it bore a rational relationship to the legitimate state interest of protecting the 
well-being of minors.120 The majority never discussed whether it found the 
statute to be content-based or content-neutral.121 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision drew a vigorous dissent questioning the 
court’s choice to be so deferential in its review of the law.122 The dissent in 
Pickup disagreed with the majority’s conclusion that the challenged law 
regulated only conduct.123 It noted that the federal courts have never ex-
empted state professional regulations of speech from First Amendment pro-
tection.124 The dissent also argued that the majority’s holding carved out 
                                                                                                                           
 118 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1221–22; see CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2015). 
 119 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229, 1231–32 (stating that the statute bans a form of treatment, which 
is conduct, and not physicians’ abilities to discuss, for example, the pros and cons of that treat-
ment). The majority specifically noted that “doctor-patient communications about medical treat-
ment receive substantial First Amendment protection.” Id. at 1227; see also Sonia M. Suter, The 
First Amendment and Physician Speech in Reproductive Decision Making, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 
22, 29 (2015) (describing the Pickup court’s choice to classify the statute as conduct). 
 120 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231–32 (reasoning that rational basis review applied because the law 
regulated only treatment and that any effect the law had on speech was merely incidental); Brian 
McGinnis, Not Strictly Speaking: Why State Prohibitions Against Practicing Sexual Orientation 
Change Efforts on Minors Are Constitutional Under First Amendment Speech Principles, 67 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 243, 269 (2015) (explaining the Ninth Circuit’s rationale that significantly 
more regulation is permitted within the professional-client relationship because the First Amend-
ment’s priority is protecting public discourse, and professionals who speak subject to a state li-
cense do not participate in the public debate). The majority applied the analysis from the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s 1985 decision in Lowe v. SEC to conclude that the law regulated only conduct. 
See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (laying out continuum framework for regula-
tions of professional speech); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1229; Suter, supra note 119, at 29 n.135 (noting 
that the Pickup court issued two opinions, and relied heavily in the second and final opinion on the 
Lowe framework). 
 121 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (stating that because the law regulated only treatment, no prece-
dent required the court to conduct an analysis of the regulation in terms of content or viewpoint 
discrimination). 
 122 Id. at 1217 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (stating that when a law prohibits professionals 
from communicating a message, the court should subject the law to “some level of scrutiny under 
the First Amendment”). The Third Circuit was also confused by the Ninth Circuit’s decision. See 
King, 767 F.3d at 226 n.12 (“It is not entirely clear why, or on what authority, the original Pickup 
opinion concluded that rational basis is the proper standard of review for a regulation of profes-
sional conduct that has an incidental effect on professional speech.”). 
 123 Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1215–18 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). The dissent specifically took 
issue with the majority’s use of labels to avoid First Amendment scrutiny. See id. at 1215, 1218 
(arguing that the regulation at issue targeted speech and that the majority could not exempt that 
speech from First Amendment protection simply by labeling it “conduct”); Bannon, supra note 34, 
at 658–59 (describing the “labeling game” approach in which courts can arbitrarily label a verbal 
communication “conduct” or “speech” to subject the communication to either rational basis re-
view or strict scrutiny). 
 124 See Pickup, 740 F.3d. at 1218 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting). 
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professional regulations as an exception to the First Amendment, something 
that went against existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent.125 
In Wollschlaeger II, the Eleventh Circuit held that a law preventing 
physician speech about firearms did not violate the doctors’ First Amend-
ment rights.126 The law at issue in Wollschlaeger II was the Florida’s Fire-
arm Owners’ Privacy Act, which restricted health care practitioners’ ability 
to ask or record information about patient firearm ownership.127 A majority 
of the panel held that the challenged law was a regulation of professional 
conduct, and thus was neither subject to First Amendment scrutiny nor in 
violation of the First Amendment rights of physicians.128 
The majority did not explain what level of scrutiny it applied to the 
regulation in question, and it did not explain whether it found the regulation 
to be content-based or content-neutral.129 The majority based its conclusion 
that the challenged law regulated conduct on the concept of “personal nex-
us” from Justice White’s concurrence in the 1985 U.S. Supreme Court case 
Lowe v. SEC, which held that professional conduct occurs when a “personal 
nexus” exists between professional and client.130 The majority concluded 
                                                                                                                           
 125 Id. at 1218–21 (“But as to the threshold issue—may California remove from the First 
Amendment’s ambit the speech of certain professionals when the State disfavors its content or its 
purpose?—the Supreme Court has definitively and unquestionably said ‘No.’”); DaSilva, supra 
note 7, at 792 & n.181 (reiterating dissent’s argument that the First Amendment does not make an 
exception for professional regulations and citing examples of cases in which professional regula-
tion was not held to be outside the First Amendment). The U.S. Supreme Court has generally 
rejected attempts to carve out other categories of speech from the First Amendment. See Brown v. 
Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2759 (2011) (explaining that the Court does not have 
“freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech outside the scope of the First 
Amendment” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 472 (2010))). 
 126 See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1230–31, 1236 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (lamenting the 
majority’s choice to uphold a law that is content-based, speaker-based, and viewpoint-based). 
 127 FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2012); see Wollschlaeger v. Farmer (Wollschlaeger I), 814 
F. Supp. 2d 1367, 1371 (S.D. Fla. 2011). 
 128 Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217, 1220 (“We find that the Act is a valid regulation of 
professional conduct that has only an incidental effect on physicians’ speech. As such, the Act 
does not facially violate the First Amendment.”). 
 129 See King, 767 F.3d at 235 n.19 (pointing out that the Wollschlaeger II majority does not 
explain what level of scrutiny applied, if it applied one at all); Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217–
26 (classifying banned physician speech as conduct and omitting any mention of whether the chal-
lenged regulation is content-based or content-neutral); id. at 1236, 1242, 1249 (Wilson, J. dissent-
ing) (characterizing the statute in question as content-based and characterizing the majority’s ap-
proach as rational basis review); Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Florida, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 
1048 & n.27 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/01/wollschlaeger-v-governor-of-florida/ 
[http://perma.cc/2GCJ-PVYL] (observing that the Eleventh Circuit in Wollschlaeger II did not use 
a content-neutrality analysis and did not explain what level of scrutiny it applied, which was de-
scribed by the dissent as rational basis review). 
 130 See Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring) (proposing that where a “personal nex-
us” exists between professional and client, a professional can be said to be “engaging in the prac-
tice of the profession,” not “speaking” as understood by the First Amendment); Wollschlaeger II, 
760 F.3d at 1217–18 (using Justice White’s concept of “personal nexus” and his related continu-
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that the challenged law furthered the governmental interests of protecting 
patient privacy and limiting abuse of the physician-patient relationship, and 
had only an “incidental effect on physicians’ speech.”131 
The dissent in Wollschlaeger II vehemently disagreed with the majori-
ty’s application of what it perceived to be rational basis review to a content-
based regulation of speech.132 The dissent criticized the majority for modi-
fying the level of scrutiny that historically has been applied to content-
based restrictions and argued that the challenged law should have been sub-
ject to at least intermediate scrutiny.133 The dissent viewed the physician’s 
behavior at issue as speech and argued that the law is a content-based, 
speaker-based, and viewpoint-based restriction of this speech that was 
passed to limit Florida doctors’ message about firearm safety.134 The dissent 
concluded that the law would not have survived intermediate scrutiny be-
cause the regulation was not necessary to protect the rights Florida claimed 
it was protecting in passing the law.135 
B. A Delicate Balance: The Duty to Regulate Versus the Right to Speak 
Some courts have been more protective of professionals’ First 
Amendment rights by applying intermediate scrutiny to professional speech 
regulations.136 In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit vacated its Wollschlaeger II 
opinion and substituted a new opinion (“Wollschlaeger III”), in which it 
applied intermediate scrutiny.137 The Third Circuit applied intermediate 
                                                                                                                           
um framework to justify conclusion that challenged law regulated conduct). A “personal nexus” 
between a physician and patient exists when a physician provides health care services in which he 
or she exercises judgment on behalf of a patient with whom he or she is familiar. See Lowe, 472 
U.S. at 232 (White, J., concurring); Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217–18. 
 131 Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217. 
 132 Id. at 1230, 1236 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (describing challenged Act as a “gag order” that 
chills practitioners’ speech and warning that the majority’s modification of the level of scrutiny 
applicable to content-based regulations was “startling and dangerous” (quoting Stevens, 559 U.S. 
at 470)). 
 133 Id. at 1236–37; see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543–44 (2012) (ex-
plaining that content-based restrictions on speech are presumed invalid). 
 134 See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1230–31 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (“[T]he perceived prob-
lem with doctors’ truthful, non-misleading message regarding firearm safety was that it was work-
ing, so the message was silenced.”). The dissent argued that physicians, despite the personal nexus 
with patients, have a First Amendment right to convey messages to their patients, about firearms 
or other topics. See id. 
 135 See id. at 1230–31, 1239, 1258–60 (articulating state’s contention that the law was passed 
to protect privacy rights of firearm owners, the right of firearm owners to be free from discrimina-
tion and harassment, and the right of firearm owners to access medical care). 
 136 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896 (applying intermediate scrutiny to regulation of 
professional speech); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 244–45 (same); King, 767 F.3d at 234 (same). 
 137 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 869, 896 (noting that in applying intermediate scrutiny 
to a regulation of professional speech, the Eleventh Circuit was “in good company” (citing Stuart 
II, 774 F.3d. at 248; King, 767 F.3d at 235; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–28)). 
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scrutiny in 2014 in King v. Governor of New Jersey.138 The Fourth Circuit 
chose to apply “heightened intermediate scrutiny” to a content-based regu-
lation of professional speech that was challenged in 2014 in Stuart v. Cam-
nitz.139 
In 2015, the Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its original opinion in 
Wollschlaeger II, in which it applied rational basis review, and substituted a 
new opinion, Wollschlaeger III, in which it applied intermediate scrutiny.140 
In a 2–1 decision, the court held that the Firearm Owners’ Privacy Act was a 
permissible regulation of physician speech.141 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court critically examined each provision of the law at issue to determine 
whether it regulated speech or conduct, concluding that three of the four chal-
lenged provisions related to speech.142 The court rejected outright the Flori-
da’s contention that Lowe stands for the proposition that professional regula-
tion impacts only conduct and thus falls outside the purview of the First 
Amendment.143 It then applied an intermediate scrutiny analysis to each of the 
provisions that regulated speech.144 Although the court agreed that the regula-
tions in question were content-based, it found intermediate scrutiny to be ap-
propriate because of the state’s deeply rooted interest in protecting the pub-
                                                                                                                           
 138 See King, 767 F.3d at 234 (reasoning that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate standard 
to use when analyzing whether a regulation of professional speech infringes a professional’s First 
Amendment right to free speech). 
 139 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (agreeing with the lower court that the appropriate standard 
of review was the “heightened intermediate scrutiny standard used in certain commercial speech 
cases” (citing Stuart I, 992 F. Supp. 2d at 600)). 
 140 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 868, 896 (declaring that intermediate scrutiny was the 
correct standard for a regulation of professional speech (citing Stuart II, 774 F.3d. at 248; King, 
767 F.3d at 235; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1227–28)). The court had before it a motion for en banc 
review, which it declared moot after issuing this new opinion. See Petition for Rehearing En Banc 
at 3, Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859 (No. 12-14009) [hereinafter Wollschlaeger III Petition for 
Rehearing En Banc]. See generally Petition for Rehearing En Banc, Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d 
1195 (No. 12-14009) [hereinafter Wollschlaeger II Petition for Rehearing En Banc] (requesting 
the Eleventh Circuit to rehear, and reverse, Wollschlaeger II en banc). 
 141 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 869 (holding that the challenged regulation is a consti-
tutional restriction of physician speech). 
 142 See id. at 886 (concluding that the record-keeping, inquiry, and harassment provisions of 
the challenged law regulated a significant amount of protected speech, whereas the discrimination 
provision regulated only conduct); see also FLA. STAT. § 790.338(1) (record-keeping); id. 
§ 790.338(2) (inquiry); id. § 790.338(5) (harassment); id. § 790.338(6) (discrimination). 
 143 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 884 (noting that Florida relied on Justice White’s con-
curring opinion in Lowe but concluding that no part of Lowe supports “the idea that the entire 
category of professional regulation touches on only conduct, and thus lies beyond the reach of the 
First Amendment”). 
 144 See id. at 896 (explaining that the challenged regulation is valid if it “‘directly advances’ a 
‘substantial’ state interest, and ‘is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest’” 
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 
(1980))). 
2015] Applying Intermediate Scrutiny to Professional Speech Regulations 2043 
lic.145 The court concluded that the challenged law withstood the test of in-
termediate scrutiny and upheld the law.146 
Despite the substantive changes to the majority opinion in Wollschlaeger 
III, the decision still drew an emphatic dissent.147 The dissent primarily disa-
greed with how the majority applied intermediate scrutiny and argued that the 
regulation could withstand neither intermediate nor strict scrutiny.148 In par-
ticular, the dissent took issue with the majority’s holding that the challenged 
law directly advanced a state interest and was not more extensive than neces-
sary to serve that interest.149 The dissent declared that the regulation was de-
signed simply to stop a political message and was not effective in relation to 
any of the State’s purported interests.150 
In King, the Third Circuit considered a First Amendment challenge to a 
similar regulation to the one at issue in Pickup that prohibited licensed 
counselors from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts with mi-
nors.151 The court held that the speech that occurs during therapy or coun-
seling is speech protected by the First Amendment.152 This speech, howev-
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 892 (“When the state seeks to regulate speech by pro-
fessionals in a context in which the state’s interests in regulating for the protection of the public is 
more deeply rooted, a lesser level of scrutiny applies.”). The plaintiffs in Wollschlaeger III had 
asked the court to apply strict scrutiny. See id. at 895. Strict scrutiny is the traditional standard 
applied to content-based laws. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2227 (2015) (hold-
ing that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny); see also Catherine L. Fisk & Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Political Speech and Association Rights After Knox v. Seiu, Local 1000, 98 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1023, 1089 (2013) (“The Supreme Court repeatedly has said that content-based 
restrictions on free speech must meet strict scrutiny . . . .”). 
 146 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896–900. The court held that “protecting the public by 
regulating the medical profession so as to safeguard patient privacy” was a substantial state inter-
est. See id. at 897. It then held that the challenged law directly advanced the substantial state inter-
est and that it was “precisely tailored” to the state’s substantial interest. See id. at 900. 
 147 See id. at 901–34 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (dissenting on the basis that the challenged law 
did not withstand intermediate scrutiny). 
 148 See id. at 901, 907–09 (explaining that the challenged regulation is unconstitutional under 
both strict and intermediate scrutiny). 
 149 See id. at 920 (articulating intermediate scrutiny standard and explaining that the chal-
lenged law fails under two of the three prongs of the test). 
 150 See id. at 902, 933. 
 151 See N.J. STAT. §§ 45:1-54 to -55 (2015); King, 767 F.3d at 220; see also Bannon, supra 
note 34, at 676 (noting how the Third Circuit recognized that professional speech regulations 
“reveal the uncomfortable tension” between the state’s police power and professional speech 
rights). The statutes at issue included legislative findings as to the deleterious impact of conver-
sion therapy on minors as well as a prohibition that forbids licensed counselors from attempting 
conversion therapy with minors. See N.J. STAT. § 45:1-54 (legislative findings); id. § 45:1-55 
(prohibition of conversion therapy). 
 152 King, 767 F.3d at 224–26, 229 (rejecting the argument that speech that occurs in the 
course of treatment is conduct and asserting that “[s]peech is speech, and it must be analyzed as 
such for the purposes of the First Amendment”). Here, the court departed from Pickup and Woll-
schlaeger II, which both determined that the behavior in question was conduct. See Wollschlaeger 
II, 760 F.3d at 1217 (declaring that challenged law was a valid regulation of professional con-
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er, does not receive the full protection of the First Amendment.153 The court 
relied on the state’s power to regulate certain professions in order to protect 
its citizens from untrustworthy or incompetent professionals.154 The court 
also noted the imbalance of knowledge that often exists in a professional-
client relationship and the trust of the client that follows.155 
The court, perhaps most importantly, held that professional speech is 
subject to only intermediate scrutiny.156 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
compared professional speech to commercial speech, which enjoys the same 
limited protection.157 Both commercial speech and professional speech are 
valuable because of their “informational function,” and both have traditional-
ly been subject to government regulation.158 The court specifically noted, 
however, that a regulation of professional speech that is not enacted to protect 
citizens from “harmful or ineffective” professional services would receive 
stricter scrutiny.159 In so holding, the court found that the regulation at issue 
both directly advanced a substantial state interest and was not more extensive 
                                                                                                                           
duct); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1222 (holding that challenged law was a regulation of professional 
conduct). 
 153 King, 767 F.3d at 229. In contrast, the court noted that when a professional speaks public-
ly, he or she enjoys the full protection of the First Amendment. See id. at 232 (“[W]hen a profes-
sional is speaking to the public at large or offering her personal opinion to a client, her speech 
remains entitled to the full scope of protection afforded by the First Amendment.”). The court 
defined professional speech, which may be regulated, as speech that occurs when a professional is 
providing a client with personalized services based on the professional’s expertise. See id. 
 154 Id. at 232; Martha Swartz, Are Physician-Patient Communications Protected by the First 
Amendment?, 2015 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 92, 98 http://www.cardozolawreview.com/content/
denovo/SWARTZ.denovo.36.pdf [http://perma.cc/HS5U-NSKT] (explaining that the Third Circuit 
afforded professional speech “diminished” First Amendment protection because the professionals 
were “state-licensed professionals within the confines of a professional relationship” (quoting 
King, 767 F.3d at 224)). 
 155 King, 767 F.3d at 232; Bannon, supra note 34, at 676 (stating that the King court needed to 
be careful not to “undermine” New Jersey’s interest in protecting its citizens from professionals 
whose “‘specialized knowledge’ put them in a position of authority” (citing King, 767 F.3d at 
232)). 
 156 See King, 767 F.3d at 233–34, 236–37 (“[W]e have serious doubts that anything less than 
intermediate scrutiny would adequately protect the First Amendment interests inherent in profes-
sional speech.”); see also Sherman, supra note 106, at 198 (describing the King decision as “with-
out question, the most protective occupational-speech decision ever issued by a federal appellate 
court”). 
 157 King, 767 F.3d at 234 (explaining that the U.S. Supreme Court has “repeatedly empha-
sized that commercial speech enjoys only diminished protection” and stating belief that profes-
sional speech is similar to commercial speech and thus should also garner only intermediate scru-
tiny). 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 235 (“Because the State’s regulatory authority over licensed professionals stems 
from its duty to protect the clients of these professionals, a state law may be subject to strict scru-
tiny if designed to advance an interest unrelated to client protection.”). 
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than necessary to serve that interest, and thus succeeded the First Amendment 
challenge.160 
In late 2014, in Stuart v. Camnitz, the Fourth Circuit applied interme-
diate scrutiny when it considered a First Amendment challenge that—like 
King, Pickup, and the Wollschlaeger cases—involved professional speech in 
the context of the medical profession.161 Stuart involved a First Amendment 
challenge to a North Carolina abortion statute that had a “display of real-
time view” requirement.162 The court determined that the display of real-
time view requirement constituted a content-based regulation of physicians’ 
speech and held that the regulation had to satisfy at least intermediate scru-
tiny to survive.163 The court conceded that abortion may be a special scenar-
io when it comes to applying constitutional principles, yet it could not go so 
far as to say that abortion is so special a case that it would nullify any First 
Amendment rights enjoyed by doctors.164 Because the court concluded that 
the regulation failed intermediate scrutiny, it declined to expand its holding 
to state whether or not the regulation at issue required application of strict 
scrutiny instead.165 
C. Professionals Are People, Too: Applying Strict Scrutiny Standard to 
Professional Speech 
Although no circuit court has yet held that strict scrutiny applies to 
professional speech regulations, many plaintiffs and scholars have argued for 
                                                                                                                           
 160 See id. at 235, 237–40. States have a strong interest in protecting the public from profes-
sionals who provide “harmful or ineffective” services. Id. at 235. 
 161 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 250 (“[The intermediate scrutiny standard] seeks to ‘ensure not 
only that the State’s interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed on speech but also 
that the law does not seek to suppress a disfavored message.’” (quoting Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc. 
131 S. Ct. 2653, 2664 (2011))). 
 162 See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85 (2011); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 242–43; see also Scott 
Gaylord, Casey and the First Amendment: Revisiting an Old Case to Resolve a New Compelled 
Speech Controversy, 66 S.C. L. REV. 951, 953 (2015) (observing that it was “surprising” that phy-
sicians seeking to stop enforcement of the speech-and-display requirement challenged the law on 
the basis of doctors’ First Amendment rights instead of solely basing the claim on a woman’s 
Fourteenth Amendment due process right). The statute, entitled “Display of real-time view re-
quirement,” required doctors to perform an ultrasound in the days leading up to an abortion and to 
display the ultrasound to the patient while also describing to the patient what the ultrasound 
showed. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.85. 
 163 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245; Gaylord, supra note 162, at 953 (observing that the Stuart II 
court found the disclosures made pursuant to the speech-and-display requirement to be “ideologi-
cal speech” that required First Amendment protection despite “convey[ing] only factual infor-
mation”). 
 164 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 255–56 (concluding that abortion is not a unique enough situa-
tion to distort the rights of professionals to speak to their patients). 
 165 Id. at 247 n.3 (explaining why the court did not address plaintiff’s claims that the display 
of real-time view requirement discriminated on the basis of viewpoint and thus required strict 
scrutiny analysis). 
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this approach.166 The application of strict scrutiny to regulations of profes-
sional speech would recognize professional speech as akin to political speech, 
which traditionally has been closely guarded by the First Amendment.167 Un-
der that rubric, just as content-based laws targeting what an individual says 
are presumed invalid, so, too, would content-based laws that target what a 
professional says when interacting with a client.168 
Recently, some have argued that the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2015 deci-
sion in Reed v. Town of Gilbert requires the application of strict scrutiny to 
content-based regulations of professional speech.169 They argue that Reed 
requires, without exception, the application of strict scrutiny whenever a chal-
                                                                                                                           
 166 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 894 (recounting plaintiff’s argument for strict scrutiny); 
Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (explaining that plaintiffs argued for strict scrutiny); King, 767 F.3d at 
236 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that challenged law should be subject to strict scrutiny); 
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 n.7 (acknowledging plaintiff’s request for strict scrutiny); Moore-King, 
708 F.3d at 567 (explaining that plaintiff argued for strict scrutiny); DaSilva, supra note 7, at 769–
70 (arguing that strict scrutiny should apply to regulations that restrict what licensed counselors 
say to their patients); Sherman, supra note 106, at 192–93 (arguing that strict scrutiny should 
apply to content-based professional speech regulations); Briella N. Kovalchek, Note, Do Actions 
Speak Louder Than Words?: An Analysis of Conversion Therapy as Protected Speech Versus 
Unprotected Conduct, 16 RUTGERS J. L. & RELIGION 428, 439 (2015) (arguing that strict scrutiny 
should apply to regulations that restrict what licensed counselors say to their patients). 
 167 See Robert Post & Amanda Shanor, Adam Smith’s First Amendment, 128 HARV. L. REV. 
F. 165, 170 (2015), http://harvardlawreview.org/2015/03/adam-smiths-first-amendment/ [http://
perma.cc/N5J7-KCKV] (describing that basic First Amendment doctrine guards “the right to par-
ticipate in the ‘public discourse’” (quoting Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 460 (2011))); Sher-
man, supra note 106, at 196–97 (arguing that because the First Amendment should be “understood 
as a broad, libertarian protection for the right to communicate on the topics of one’s choice,” regu-
lations of professional speech should be treated the same way as regulations of political speech). 
Courts’ reluctance to apply “traditional First Amendment principles” to professional speech has 
resulted in claims that they have created an exception to the First Amendment out of whole cloth. 
See Sherman, supra note 106, at 191–92 (explaining that Justice White’s rule from Lowe essential-
ly creates a categorical exception for professional speech); see also Lowe, 472 U.S. at 232 (White, 
J., concurring) (proposing framework for professional speech regulations whereby speech that 
occurs within the “personal nexus” is treated as professional conduct and speech that occurs out-
side of the “personal nexus” is treated as speech for the purposes of the First Amendment). The 
U.S. Supreme Court has declared that courts may not create such exceptions. See Brown, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2734 (explaining that courts do not have “freewheeling authority to declare new categories 
of speech” that are exempt from the First Amendment (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 
460, 472 (2010))). But see Collins, supra note 53, at 417–22 (enumerating nearly fifty categories 
of unprotected expression). 
 168 See Sherman, supra note 106, at 192–93 (arguing that professional speech should be treat-
ed the same as other “content-defined categor[ies] of speech” by subjecting regulations of profes-
sional speech to strict scrutiny). 
 169 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (proposing blanket application of strict scrutiny to content-
based laws); Appellees’ Submission, supra note 64, at 2, 4 (arguing that Reed requires application 
of strict scrutiny to the challenged content-based regulation in Wollschlaeger III); Doe Petition for 
Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at 8 (asking the Court to grant certiorari to a case similar to King 
in order to apply strict scrutiny per the Reed holding and to overturn the Third Circuit’s use of 
intermediate scrutiny). 
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lenged law is content-based.170 Because “content-based” was determined by 
the Court to include “subject-matter regulation,” all regulations targeting the 
topic of professional speech would be subject to strict scrutiny as content-
based laws.171 It is unclear if any challenged regulations of professional 
speech could be upheld under a strict scrutiny standard.172 
III. JUST WHAT THE DOCTOR ORDERED: IMPOSE INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
ON CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL SPEECH 
The collection of case law that has amassed over the past several dec-
ades provides no cohesive framework for determining which regulations of 
professional speech violate the First Amendment.173 Professional speech 
                                                                                                                           
 170 Appellees’ Submission, supra note 64, at 2, 4 (calling for the Eleventh Circuit to apply 
strict scrutiny to the challenged regulation in Wollschlaeger III in light of Reed); see Reed, 135 S. 
Ct. at 2227 (holding that content-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny). 
 171 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (describing a content-based law as one that “applies to partic-
ular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed”); Appellees’ Submis-
sion, supra note 64, at 3–4 (describing the holding in Reed and concluding that the challenged law 
is content-based because “it restricts the speech of a single group (doctors) on a single topic (fire-
arms)”). 
 172 Compare Appellees’ Submission, supra note 64, at 9 (arguing that the law challenged in 
Wollschlaeger III does not serve a compelling state interest and thus cannot withstand strict scru-
tiny), with Appellants’ Memorandum Addressing the Impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona 
at 12–15, Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d 859 (No. 12-14009) [hereinafter Appellants’ Memorandum] 
(arguing that the law challenged in Wollschlaeger III could withstand strict scrutiny). 
 173 See Stuart v. Camnitz (Stuart II), 774 F.3d 238, 255 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 2838 (2015) (explaining that in the area of professional regulation and professional expression, 
there are few absolutes); King v. Governor of N.J., 767 F.3d at 235 n.19 (3d Cir. 2014) (demon-
strating confusion among the federal courts about what level of scrutiny to apply to regulations of 
professional speech), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 2048 (2015); Jones, supra note 87, at 649 (noting 
that the First Amendment jurisprudence on professional speech has been minimally developed). 
The recent case law on the professional speech rights of physicians demonstrates this point. Com-
pare Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlaeger II), 760 F.3d 1195, 1217–19 (11th Cir. 
2014), vacated, 797 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that the state could prohibit physician 
speech on certain topics without implicating their First Amendment rights and declining to apply 
intermediate or strict scrutiny to such a regulation), with Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 244–45 (applying 
intermediate scrutiny to First Amendment challenge of compelled physician speech). Part of the 
difficulty concerning regulations of professional speech is that there are two overlapping issues at 
play: (1) whether professional speech is speech or conduct, and (2) what level of scrutiny to apply 
if it is a regulation of speech. See King, 767 F.3d at 229 (“[S]peech is speech, and it must be ana-
lyzed as such for purposes of the First Amendment.”); Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217–18 
(labeling the speech in question as conduct that could be regulated by the state). Existing prece-
dent suggests that the government may not escape First Amendment review of a regulation aimed 
at limiting speech by arguing that the regulation applies to conduct only. Wollschlaeger II Petition 
for Rehearing En Banc, supra note 140, at 4–9 (reviewing existing precedent). In addition, a 
court’s task in navigating the professional speech doctrine is further complicated by the partisan 
interests at play in many of the challenged regulations. See Dolgin, supra note 15, at 302 & n.59 
(observing that professional speech regulations concerning firearms and abortion developed as 
part of America’s “culture wars”). See generally Wollschlaeger v. Governor of Fla. (Wollschlae-
ger III), 797 F.3d 859, 908 (11th Cir. 2015) (Wilson, J., dissenting) (expressing that the chal-
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rights are a growing issue in the United States, and it would be shortsighted 
to accept an ad hoc, unwieldy jurisprudence that has decided the First 
Amendment rights of professionals based on polarizing issues.174 In a dis-
pute like the present one where the goalposts are always moving, the best—
and perhaps only viable—outcome is to have the highest court issue an 
opinion as to the correct level of scrutiny to apply to professional speech.175 
This Part argues that intermediate scrutiny should apply to all content-
based regulations of professional speech.176 Section A argues that all regula-
tions of professional speech are content-based and thus should be treated 
with higher scrutiny than rational basis review.177 Section B explains why 
strict scrutiny, the level of review favored by plaintiffs, is not the appropri-
ate standard of review for content-based regulations of professional 
speech.178 Section C argues that intermediate scrutiny is the appropriate 
standard of review for content-based regulations of professional speech.179 
A. All Regulations of Professional Speech Are Content-Based 
All regulations of professional speech are content-based because they 
are focused on altering the content of what a professional conveys or does 
not convey to a client.180 Licensed professionals provide personalized ad-
                                                                                                                           
lenged law limited speech about guns because the legislature wanted to limit physicians’ messages 
on the topic); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (discussing the purpose of the challenged regulation as 
sending a message to patients that abortion was a disfavored course of action); King, 767 F.3d at 
220, 236 (upholding law banning conversion therapy but making clear that First Amendment scru-
tiny was required to ensure the state was not merely regulating professional speech to limit “polit-
ically-disfavored messages”). 
 174 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 903 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (describing gun ownership 
as a public health issue and rejecting majority’s choice to uphold a law banning physician-patient 
speech about gun ownership); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (applying a heightened level of scrutiny to 
determine the rights of professionals where a pro-life law is implicated); Pickup v. Brown, 740 
F.3d 1208, 1222 (9th Cir. 2013) (allowing government regulation to trump free speech rights of 
the minority of professionals who practice conversion therapy), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2871 
(2015). 
 175 See Hines Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 18, at i (presenting the question of 
whether regulations of professional speech are subject to First Amendment heightened scrutiny or 
rational basis review); King Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 106, at 7, 20. 
 176 See infra notes 180–221 and accompanying text. 
 177 See infra notes 180–191 and accompanying text. 
 178 See infra notes 192–203 and accompanying text. 
 179 See infra notes 204–221 and accompanying text. 
 180 See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1263–64 (Wilson, J., dissenting); see also Pickup, 740 
F.3d at 1217–18 (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (explaining that the law in question is silencing a 
particular message that doctors wish to communicate to their patients). More generally, all regula-
tions of professional speech could be construed as subject-matter regulation, which would make 
them content-based regulations. See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2230, 2232–33 
(2015) (“[A] speech regulation targeted at specific subject matter is content-based . . . .”); see also 
Norton v. City of Springfield, 612 F. App’x 386, 387 (7th Cir. 2015) (concluding that Reed “effec-
tively abolishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation”). 
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vice to clients in the context of a professional relationship.181 Professionals 
provide a critical source of information for their clients through a relation-
ship that frequently has significant knowledge asymmetries.182 As soon as a 
professional begins to offer advice to a client, states have an interest in what 
the professional says.183 
State legislatures have used their regulatory powers in order to control 
the words and thoughts of professionals whose work impacts topics of serious 
concern to the legislatures, such as abortion, gun ownership, and gay rights.184 
Regulations of professional speech like these, and others on less inflammato-
ry topics, specifically target the content of the speech and the message con-
veyed by that content.185 The express purpose of regulations of professional 
speech is to control what messages professionals convey to their clients.186 
                                                                                                                           
 181 See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 232 (1985) (White, J., concurring) (describing “personal 
nexus” as a hallmark of professional speech); Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 885 (using frame-
work from Lowe as basis for determining whether challenged provisions regulated conduct or 
speech). 
 182 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 868–69 (recounting the power imbalance between doc-
tors and their patients that exists in an examination room because of the doctor’s specialized 
knowledge); King, 767 F.3d at 234 (describing value of professional speech to listeners and socie-
ty because of the informational function it serves); see also Rob Atkinson, An Elevation of Neo-
Classical Professionalism in Law and Business, 12 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 621, 696 (2014) (ex-
plaining that the imbalance of knowledge between professionals and clients can give professionals 
an opportunity to exploit their clients and thus professionals may need to be regulated). 
 183 See King, 767 F.3d at 234 (describing the traditional power of the states to regulate profes-
sions); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis v. Cal. Bd. of Psychology, 228 F.3d 
1043, 1054 (9th Cir. 2000) (describing the state’s power to regulate the professions using its po-
lice power); see also King, 767 F.3d at 232 (arguing that restricting a state’s ability to regulate 
professionals would undermine its authority to protect the public). 
 184 See Dolgin, supra note 15, at 302–28, 342 (discussing recent laws limiting professional 
speech as reflecting America’s “culture wars” on topics such as gun ownership and abortion); see, 
e.g., Wollschlaeger III, 797 F. 3d at 869 (assessing law passed by the Florida legislature that limits 
the content of questions a physician may ask a patient to only those that do not include inquiries 
about firearm ownership); King, 767 F. 3d at 237, 240 (considering a challenge to a New Jersey 
law that prohibited licensed therapists from practicing conversion therapy with minors); Pickup, 
740 F.3d at 1231–32 (considering a challenge to a California law that prohibited licensed thera-
pists from engaging in sexual orientation change efforts with minors). 
 185 See CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (West 2013) (prohibiting conversion therapy with 
minors); N.J. STAT. § 45:1-55 (2013) (same); Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 908 (Wilson, J., dis-
senting) (“[T]he perceived problem with doctors’ truthful, non-misleading message regarding 
firearm safety was that it was working, so the message was silenced. That is classic viewpoint 
discrimination.”); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (holding that the display of real-time view require-
ment regulated expressive conduct because there was a clear message conveyed in requiring a 
woman seeking an abortion to have a sonogram). 
 186 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 865 (prohibiting conversion therapy with minors); 
FLA. STAT. § 790.338 (2012) (prohibiting physicians from inquiring into patient firearm owner-
ship except when relevant to patient’s medical care); N.J. STAT. § 45:1-55 (prohibiting conversion 
therapy with minors). 
2050 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 56:2019 
Content-based restrictions on speech are generally subject to either in-
termediate scrutiny or strict scrutiny.187 One exception to applying strict 
scrutiny to content-based restrictions of speech has been in the area of pro-
fessional speech regulation.188 This may be due to the fact that this speech 
occurs in an area that is already so highly regulated by the state, and that 
regulatory structure creates the illusion that the speech falls outside the 
bounds of the First Amendment.189 This illusion should not be enough to 
strip professionals of their First Amendment rights when they interact with 
clients.190 Instead, courts should acknowledge the reality that professional 
speech exists in a highly regulated area by applying intermediate scrutiny, 
which effectively balances the important interests of the state against the 
individual rights of professionals.191 
B. Why Strict Scrutiny Offers Too Much Protection for Professional Speech 
Plaintiffs in professional speech cases commonly request that courts 
apply strict scrutiny to content-based regulations of professional speech.192 
When applying strict scrutiny, courts uphold a regulation only if it “furthers 
a compelling governmental interest and is narrowly tailored to [achieve] 
that end.”193 It is possible that plaintiffs request strict scrutiny in part be-
cause it implies “near-automatic condemnation” of a regulation.194 Despite 
                                                                                                                           
 187 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (applying strict scrutiny to content-based regulation of 
speech); Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2667 (2011) (applying heightened scrutiny 
to content-based regulation of commercial speech). 
 188 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896 (applying intermediate scrutiny to content-based 
regulation of professional speech); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (same); King, 767 F.3d at 234 
(same). 
 189 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 247 (illustrating the different kinds of regulations states may 
enact to regulate the professions); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 
1054 (describing the states’ police power and states’ ability to regulate the professions). 
 190 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 902 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (explaining that doctors 
have a First Amendment right to convey messages to patients). 
 191 See id. at 896 (majority opinion) (utilizing intermediate scrutiny analysis for professional 
speech); King, 767 F.3d at 237 (same). 
 192 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 894 (explaining plaintiff’s contention that the chal-
lenged regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (stating that the 
plaintiffs argued that the challenged law should be subject to strict scrutiny); King, 767 F.3d at 
236 (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that challenged law should be subject to strict scrutiny); 
Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 n.7 (acknowledging plaintiff’s request that the court apply strict scrutiny 
to the challenged law); Moore-King v. County of Chesterfield, 708 F.3d 560, 567 (4th Cir. 2013) 
(explaining that the plaintiff argued that the challenged law should trigger strict scrutiny review). 
 193 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231 (articulating strict scrutiny standard); see also Brown v. Entm’t 
Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738 (2011) (explaining that to pass strict scrutiny, the regulation 
in question must be “justified by a compelling government interest” and “narrowly drawn to serve 
that interest”). 
 194 United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2552 (2012); see Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 
(Breyer, J., concurring) (referring to strict scrutiny as “almost certain legal condemnation”); Wil-
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these repeated requests, to date no court has applied strict scrutiny to a regu-
lation of professional speech.195 
In 2015, in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the U.S. Supreme Court may have 
opened the door to a broader application of strict scrutiny.196 In Reed, the 
Court drew a firm line in insisting that all content-based regulations should 
be subject to strict scrutiny.197 Traditionally, courts apply strict scrutiny to 
content-based restrictions because of the high value placed on free public 
discourse.198 This rationale does not apply to professional speech, which 
cannot be described as speech in the public discourse.199 
                                                                                                                           
liams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1665–66 (2015) (reiterating that it is rare for a law regu-
lating speech to survive strict scrutiny analysis); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 
54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 53 (1987) (asserting that the application of strict scrutiny “almost invaria-
bly” results in the challenged law being found unconstitutional); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory 
and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 
793, 815 (2006) (concluding based on empirical analysis that when strict scrutiny is applied in free 
speech cases, few laws survive). 
 195 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245 (applying intermediate scrutiny to First Amendment chal-
lenge to compelled physician speech); Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1217–18 (applying rational 
basis review); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 (applying rational basis review). 
 196 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230, 2232–33 (holding that content-based regulations of speech 
are subject to strict scrutiny); Norton, 612 F. App’x at 387 (asserting that Reed “effectively abol-
ishes any distinction between content regulation and subject-matter regulation”); Appellees’ Sub-
mission, supra note 64, at 2, 4 (arguing that Reed requires that application of strict scrutiny to the 
challenged content-based regulation in Wollschlaeger III); Doe Petition for Writ of Certiorari, 
supra note 18, at 8 (asking the Court to grant certiorari in order to apply strict scrutiny per the 
Reed holding and to overturn the Third Circuit’s use of intermediate scrutiny). 
 197 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231–32. But see Post, supra note 167, at 181–82 (arguing that 
there is no single First Amendment doctrine that can be applied to all speech). 
 198 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (applying strict scrutiny to content-based regulation of 
speech); Post, supra note 167 at 179 (describing rationale behind applying strict scrutiny to con-
tent-based restrictions). To police the content of messages in the public forum would be to rob 
people of their right to speak freely, which is the cornerstone of democracy. See Post, supra note 
167 at 179 (arguing that the wariness with which courts approach content-based restrictions is 
demonstrative of the equality of messages and voices that makes up a democracy). 
 199 See Hill, supra note 56, at 62 (distinguishing professional speech from public discourse); 
Post, supra note 167, at 179 (stating that professional speech “by definition lies outside of public 
discourse”). Courts have recognized that some professional speech has ideological aspects, partic-
ularly in the case of abortion. See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245; Gaylord, supra note 162, at 953 
(characterizing the speech in question in Stuart II as “ideological speech” requiring First Amend-
ment protection despite “convey[ing] only factual information”). Yet, licensed professionals can-
not claim a right to freely state their opinions when their ability to speak to clients at all relies 
entirely on the state’s power to license them to do so. See Post, supra note 167, at 179, 181 (ask-
ing whether people would want the professional-client relationship to be based on political equali-
ty of speech instead of restrictions set by state standards). The same could be said of commercial 
speech. See id. at 181–82 (arguing that “First Amendment doctrine is plural” such that principles 
that protect free speech in a public forum by an individual would not apply to commercial speech 
or professional speech). 
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In the case of professional speech, courts have generally rejected strict 
scrutiny because it offers too much protection to the speech.200 In an area 
such as professional regulation that has traditionally been left to the states, 
to remove a considerable portion of their power is not only unnecessary, but 
also unprecedented.201 To a certain extent, professionals should expect to be 
regulated by the state because the state already licenses their profession and 
authorizes them to practice at all.202 The solution is not to disregard the 
state’s interest in regulating professionals, but instead to balance the inter-
ests of the state in protecting its citizens against the First Amendment rights 
of professionals.203 
C. Intermediate Scrutiny Balances a Professional’s First Amendment Rights 
with the State’s Interests in Protecting Citizens’ Safety and Welfare 
The appropriate approach for content-based regulations of professional 
speech is the proportionality approach of intermediate scrutiny.204 Three 
federal appellate courts that have been presented with the issue of First 
Amendment protection of professional speech have selected intermediate 
scrutiny, intuiting that it strikes the right balance in this heavily regulated 
area of speech.205 Under this approach, the burden on the speech in question 
                                                                                                                           
 200 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 244–45 (applying intermediate scrutiny instead of strict scruti-
ny); King, 767 F.3d at 236 (refusing to apply strict scrutiny); Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 n.7 (same); 
Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 567–69 (same). But see Appellees’ Submission, supra note 64, at 1 (de-
scribing Eleventh Circuit’s request for supplementary briefing on whether the Reed holding re-
quires application of strict scrutiny to regulation of professional speech). 
 201 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 244–45; King, 767 F.3d at 236; Pickup, 740 F.3d at 1231 n.7; 
Moore-King, 708 F.3d at 567–9; see also Nat’l Ass’n for the Advancement of Psychoanalysis, 228 
F.3d at 1054 (describing state’s police power to regulate the professions). 
 202 See Kry, supra note 15, at 886; see, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 08.04.450 (2015) (describing 
revocation of a license to practice accounting); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 112 § 2 (2015) (describing 
licensing of physicians); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-34-15 (2015) (describing licensing of practical nurs-
es). 
 203 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896–901 (applying intermediate scrutiny standard to 
challenged regulation of professional speech); King, 767 F.3d at 234–36 (holding that intermediate 
scrutiny applied to challenged regulation of professional speech because of state interest in regula-
tion and need to protect professionals’ First Amendment rights). 
 204 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 892 (reasoning that U.S. Supreme Court precedent 
indicates the application of intermediate scrutiny in situations where “the State seeks to regulate 
speech by professionals in a context in which the State’s interest for the protection of the public is 
more deeply rooted”); King, 767 F.3d at 234, 236 (applying intermediate scrutiny analysis and 
“doubt[ing] that anything less than intermediate scrutiny would adequately protect the First 
Amendment interests inherent in professional speech”); Post, supra note 167, at 178 (rejecting 
strict scrutiny approach to content-based regulations of professional speech because professional 
speech is not part of the public discourse and because such an approach would be unworkable 
given the current regulatory framework). 
 205 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896 (analyzing the limited existing precedent and con-
cluding that intermediate scrutiny was the correct standard of review to apply); King, 767 F.3d at 
235 (applying intermediate scrutiny to professional speech by analogy to commercial speech). 
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is weighed against the state’s regulatory objectives.206 This approach neither 
gives legislatures free rein to dictate what professionals may say, nor does it 
completely disregard the complex and vast regulatory structure surrounding 
licensed professions.207 Instead, it respects that professionals have a right to 
speak and that states have a right, even a duty, to regulate the professions in 
order to protect the public.208 
A similar approach has been taken already in commercial speech cas-
es.209 Commercial speech is a useful analog to professional speech because 
both areas of speech are highly regulated by the government.210 In addition, 
both commercial speech and professional speech serve an “informational 
function.”211 When a court addresses a content-based regulation of commer-
cial speech, it weighs the state’s interest in regulating the commercial 
                                                                                                                           
 206 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2235–36 (Breyer, J., concurring) (describing proportionality ap-
proach to the First Amendment). But see Appellees’ Submission, supra note 64, at 3 (applying 
Reed to a challenged regulation of professional speech and arguing that Reed’s blanket prohibition 
against content-based regulations of speech nullifies any inquiry into the state’s purpose in enact-
ing the regulation). 
 207 See Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1249–50 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (stating that the hold-
ing, in which the majority applied rational basis review to a challenged regulation of professional 
speech, gave too much power to legislatures); Post, supra note 167, at 178 (arguing that profes-
sional speech inherently falls outside the scope of public discourse and thus should not be regulat-
ed the same way core First Amendment speech would be). 
 208 See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (“To be sure, the physi-
cian’s First Amendment rights not to speak are implicated, but only as part of the practice of med-
icine, subject to reasonable licensing and regulation by the State.”); King, 767 F.3d at 234 (ex-
plaining that states traditionally have power to regulate professions); Nat’l Ass’n for the Advance-
ment of Psychoanalysis, 228 F.3d at 1054 (describing the state’s power to regulate the professions 
using its police power); Stuart v. Loomis (Stuart I), 992 F. Supp. 2d 585, 596 (M.D.N.C. 2014) 
(“[I]t is clear that individuals do not surrender their First Amendment rights entirely when they 
speak as professionals.”), aff’d, 774 F.3d 238. 
 209 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668 (explaining that “heightened scrutiny” ensures that “the 
State’s interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed on speech but also that the law 
does not seek to suppress a disfavored message”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–62 (1980) (recognizing the First Amendment value of com-
mercial speech, but refusing to grant the same protections as political speech because commercial 
speech was traditionally subject to government regulation). 
 210 See Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245, 248 (affirming lower court’s choice to borrow an intermedi-
ate scrutiny standard from commercial speech because professional speech displayed similar traits, 
such as being already subject to regulation); King, 767 F.3d at 234 (explaining that intermediate 
standard is the appropriate standard of review to apply to professional speech because, like com-
mercial speech, it “occurs in an area traditionally subject to government regulation” (quoting Cent. 
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 562)); Wollschlaeger II, 760 F.3d at 1241–42 n.11 (Wil-
son, J., dissenting) (“The [physician] speech then seems to fall under the rubric of commercial 
speech, subject to intermediate scrutiny.”). 
 211 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 890 (describing informational value of professional 
speech and comparing it to informational value of commercial speech); King, 767 F.3d at 234 
(explaining that both commercial speech and professional speech are “valuable to listeners” be-
cause of the information they convey). 
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speech against the actor’s right to speak freely.212 Applying the same ap-
proach to professional speech ensures not only that the state’s interests in 
regulating the speech are “proportional to the  . . . burdens” on profession-
als, but also that the laws that are allowed to regulate professional speech do 
not “suppress . . .  disfavored” opinions or messages.213 
The recent U.S. Supreme Court opinion in Reed does not disclose the 
application of intermediate scrutiny to content-based regulations of profes-
sional speech.214 Reed discusses what constitutes a content-based regulation 
and reiterates longstanding precedent that content-based regulations of core 
First Amendment speech should be subject to strict scrutiny.215 The opinion 
is silent on the threshold question of whether professional speech is categor-
ically different from other types of speech.216 Additionally, the opinion is 
                                                                                                                           
 212 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2667–68 (applying Central Hudson test for intermediate scrutiny 
to challenged content-based regulation of commercial speech); Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 890 
(describing the state’s interest in safety of the public and the public’s interest in information as the 
two competing interests considered when analyzing professional and commercial speech). 
 213 See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2668 (explaining that “heightened scrutiny” ensures that “the 
State’s interests are proportional to the resulting burdens placed on speech but also that the law 
does not seek to suppress a disfavored message”). For example, in King, the court explained that 
professional speech receives less protection under the First Amendment because of the state’s 
interest in protecting its citizens from “harmful or ineffective” professional practices, which was 
the same reason the law in question was passed. See 767 F.3d at 236–37 (concluding that the chal-
lenged regulation did not trigger strict scrutiny analysis because, although it was content based, it 
did not discriminate based on content in an impermissible manner). 
 214 See Appellants’ Memorandum, supra note 172, at 10, 11 (expressing that Reed does not 
address what standard of scrutiny to apply to professional speech and arguing that Reed cannot 
require strict scrutiny for such regulations because it did not overrule Casey, which is the last time 
the Court spoke on the subject of professional speech); Post, supra note 167, at 178 (asserting that 
professional speech is not public discourse and does not need to be protected in the same way as 
political speech). 
 215 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (explaining that a regulation is content-based if it “applies to 
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or message conveyed” and that con-
tent-based laws are subject to strict scrutiny). If the U.S. Supreme Court has made anything clear 
in the last twenty years, it is that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. See Ysura v. 
Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353, 358 (2009) (“Restrictions on speech based on its content are 
‘presumptively invalid’ and subject to strict scrutiny.”); City of Los Angeles. v. Alameda Books, 
Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002) (“If the regulation were content based, it would be considered pre-
sumptively invalid and subject to strict scrutiny.”); Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 769 (2000) 
(“The Court time and again has held content-based or viewpoint-based regulations to be presump-
tively invalid.”); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) (“Content-based regulations 
are presumptively invalid.”). It is within this existing framework that the commercial speech ex-
ception to this rule was articulated. See Sorrell, 131 S. Ct. at 2664, 2667 (finding that heightened 
scrutiny applied to content-based regulation of commercial speech and noting that “[i]n the ordi-
nary case” a finding that a law is content-based “is all but dispositive”). 
 216 Appellants’ Memorandum, supra note 172, at 6–7 (noting that Reed neither discussed how 
different categories of speech, such as commercial or government speech, should be treated, nor 
did it speak to whether professional speech was a separate category); cf. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar 
Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (reiterating the “‘commonsense’ distinction” the Court has 
made between commercial speech, “which occurs in an area traditionally subject to government 
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startlingly broad and attempts to apply a one-size-fits-all approach despite 
the nuances of First Amendment doctrine.217 
First Amendment principles and common sense require the application 
of intermediate scrutiny to regulations of professional speech.218 The appli-
cation of rational basis review to regulations of professional speech is inap-
propriate because such regulations are inherently content-based.219 The ap-
plication of strict scrutiny to regulations of professional speech is inappro-
priate because it treats professional speech like political speech, an unnec-
essary departure from the traditional approach to First Amendment catego-
ries.220 Only intermediate scrutiny strikes the right balance between the duty 
the government has to keep the public safe and the right professionals have 
to offer their professional opinions.221 
CONCLUSION 
Professionals are an important part of the fabric of every community be-
cause they provide necessary—even lifesaving—services. When regulations 
of professionals restrict what they may say to clients or compel them to con-
vey a message to a client, however, the First Amendment rights of profes-
sionals are implicated. Because any regulation of professional speech is nec-
essarily content-based, when reviewing such a regulation, a court must apply 
some level of judicial scrutiny. To resolve the circuit split between the Third, 
Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals, the U.S. Supreme 
                                                                                                                           
regulation, and other . . . speech” (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976))). 
 217 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (holding that content-based laws are subject to strict scruti-
ny); id. at 2235 (Breyer, J., concurring) (arguing that content discrimination “cannot and should 
not always trigger strict scrutiny”); id. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring) (arguing that the Court 
would regret the Reed opinion); see also Cal. Outdoor Equity Partners v. City of Corona, No. 15-
cv-03172, 2015 WL 4163346, at *10 (C.D. Cal. July 9, 2015) (“Reed is most notable for what it is 
not about, and what it does not say.”); Appellants’ Memorandum, supra note 172, at 8 (noting that 
two district courts have recently held that Reed does not apply to commercial speech). 
 218 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896 (reasoning to an intermediate standard of review 
based on the limited existing U.S. Supreme Court precedent); Stuart II, 774 F.3d at 245, 248 (ap-
proving of the choice to borrow an intermediate scrutiny standard from commercial speech cases). 
 219 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230, 2232–33 (establishing that content-based distinctions include 
ones made on the basis of topic or subject); Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. at 2543–44 (explaining that con-
tent-based restrictions on speech are presumed invalid). 
 220 See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56 (observing approvingly the “‘commonsense’ distinction” 
the Court makes between commercial speech and other types of speech, on the basis that commer-
cial speech has historically been regulated by the states (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharm., 425 U.S. 
at 771 n.24)); Post, supra note 167, at 178 (rejecting strict scrutiny approach to content-based 
regulations of professional speech because professional speech is inherently different from politi-
cal speech, to which traditional First Amendment principles apply). 
 221 See Wollschlaeger III, 797 F.3d at 896–901 (applying intermediate scrutiny standard); 
King, 767 F.3d at 234–36 (concluding that intermediate scrutiny applied to challenged regulation 
of professional speech). 
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Court should establish that the appropriate framework for reviewing profes-
sional speech is intermediate scrutiny, because it is the only standard that ef-
fectively balances the important state interest of protecting citizens’ health 
and welfare with the First Amendment speech rights of professionals. To al-
low any lower standard of scrutiny, or none at all, raises the potential for leg-
islatures to control the speech of professionals on any number of topics. To 
insist upon a higher standard of scrutiny risks depriving the states of an im-
portant part of their police power and disrupting existing professional regula-
tion schemes. The U.S. Supreme Court has left the professional speech doc-
trine sitting in the waiting room for years. It is time for the Court to call its 
name and give it the treatment it deserves: intermediate scrutiny. 
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